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INTRODUCTION
A discussion of the modern procedures for processing and
adjudicating the immigration status of unaccompanied alien children
(UACs)—non-citizen children who are unaccompanied by their parents
and come into contact with immigration authorities—must begin in
1985 with the filing of the Flores lawsuit, federal litigation that remains
ongoing. 1 Much of the current law regarding these minor migrants has
its genesis in that litigation. 2 Yet, we are currently in the midst of an
era that began much more recently, an ongoing reality that the Obama
administration called a humanitarian crisis and the Trump
administration has deemed a threat to national security and our very
identity as the United States. 3 Through myriad administrative actions,
various officials within the current administration have methodically
narrowed UACs’ ability to lawfully remain in the United States. In

1. See, e.g., Order Denying Defendants’ “Ex Parte Application for Limited
Relief from Settlement Agreement,” Flores v. Sessions, CV 85-4544-DMG (AGRx)
(C.D. Cal. July 9, 2018).
2. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, CV 85-4544-RJK (Px)
(C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 17, 1997).
3. Compare Tim Hull, Humanitarian Crisis on the U.S. Border, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERV. (June 11, 2014), https://www.courthousenews.com/humanitarian-crisison-the-u-s-border/ (“President Barack Obama called the influx ‘an urgent
humanitarian situation requiring a unified and coordinated federal response.’”), with
Seung Min Kim, Trump Warns Against Admitting Unaccompanied Migrant Children:
POST
(May
23,
2018),
‘They’re
Not
Innocent,’
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-warns-against-admittingunaccompanied-migrant-children-theyre-not-innocent/2018/05/23/e4b24a68-5ec211e8-8c93-8cf33c21da8d_story.html (“Trump added: ‘They look so innocent.
They’re not innocent.’”).
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doing so, the current administration has intentionally manufactured a
massive and ever-growing population of non-citizen children who will
be without lawful status. As such, a self-fulfilling prophecy has
emerged: many UACs will remain in the United States without lawful
immigration status and employment authorization, leaving them
permanent outsiders to the community.
The arrival of UACs to the United States is not new, but between
2011 and 2013, the number of UACs arriving doubled, and the numbers
doubled again in 2014. 4 At the time, the sudden arrival of tens of
thousands of children was seen as a “surge”—a temporary increase to
be addressed (humanely) and overcome. 5 The children were processed
according to existing law and policy simply in increased numbers. The
government added new facilities to ensure the children were cared for
in accordance with the Flores settlement and the federal laws enacted
to comply with that settlement. 6 The children were generally
unhindered in seeking the lawful immigration status for which they may
have been eligible. Indeed, while the Obama administration (consistent
with federal law) vehemently opposed legal challenges demanding that
these children be appointed government-funded counsel, the

4. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. BORDER PATROL TOTAL
MONTHLY UAC APPREHENSIONS BY SECTOR (FY 2010 – FY 2017) (July 2, 2018),
https://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/us-border-patrol-total-monthly-uacapprehensions-sector-fy-2010-fy-2017 [hereinafter TOTAL MONTHLY UAC
APPREHENSIONS]; OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM.
SERV.,
FACTS
AND
DATA
(May
18,
2019),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/ucs/facts-and-data [hereinafter FACTS AND DATA];
see also U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Children on the Run 4 (2014)
[hereinafter Children on the Run].
5. See Press Release, President Barack Obama, Office of the Press Secretary,
Response to the Influx of Unaccompanied Alien Children Across the Southwest
Border
(June
2,
2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/06/02/presidential-memorandum-response-influx-unaccompanied-alienchildren-acr (instructing federal agencies to coordinate in responding to the
“humanitarian aspects” of the “influx” of UACs consistent with existing law).
6. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Jeremy W. Peters, Obama Asks for $3.7 Billion
TIMES
(July
8,
2014),
to
Aid
Border,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/us/obama-seeks-billions-for-childrenimmigration-crisis.html.
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administration nonetheless supported efforts to ensure that these
children had access to free legal counsel. 7
The change from the Obama administration to the Trump
administration saw a fundamental shift as to how the federal
government views UACs. Federal executives have altered legal
interpretation, administrative processing, and policy implementation of
immigration laws regarding UACs. Each change has decreased the
likelihood that individual UACs will be granted immigration status and
permitted to permanently and lawfully reside in the United States.
Some of these changes have made immediate repatriation more likely,
but others likely disincentivize compliance with the law. This article
will address how this has occurred in three areas: (1) greater hindrances
to UACs being released from federal detention; (2) narrowed
opportunities for UACs to apply for and be granted asylum; and (3)
decreased eligibility for abandoned, abused, and neglected UACs to
seek permanent residency.
Certain facts are beyond dispute, but perception can be influential.
It is an indisputable fact that hundreds of thousands of UACs arrived to
the United States in the last several years. 8 If UACs are denied access
to the legal protections the law provides for them, they will either be
deported or remain an underclass permanently excluded from full
participation in society. UACs do not need to be confined to such a
future. The narrative matters.
I. A VERY BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION LAW
The United States Constitution establishes that certain
individuals—the vast majority of those persons born within the territory

7. Compare J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016) (dismissing
on jurisdictional grounds a suit brought by unaccompanied minors claiming
constitutional and statutory right to appointed counsel), with Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Justice Department and CNCS Announce $1.8 Million in Grants to
Enhance Immigration Court Proceedings and Provide Legal Assistance to
Unaccompanied Children (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-and-cncs-announce-18-million-grants-enhance-immigration-courtproceedings (announcing Justice Department collaboration to ensure UACs are
represented).
8. See sources cited supra note 4.
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of the United States—are citizens of this country. 9 Congress has
legislated additional classes of people who are citizens or non-citizen
nationals of the United States. 10 And, pursuant to its constitutional
authority, Congress has established laws for the naturalization of certain
immigrants—the process by which noncitizens become citizens. 11
Everyone else must have permission from the U.S. government to
enter or be present in the country. 12 Explicit (and distinct) permission
is also required for a noncitizen to work in the United States.13
Noncitizens who have been granted permission to enter or be present in
the United States may lose such permission for a variety of reasons. 14
Conduct that may subject a noncitizen to deportation ranges from
staying longer than permitted to committing a crime. 15 Others will be
found ineligible for admission to the United States for reasons
including, but not limited to, being poor or sick, having committed
certain crimes, supporting terrorist organizations, or having any prior
negative immigration history. 16
When immigration officers identify a noncitizen without lawful
permission to enter or be present in the United States, the officers may
begin the formal process to “remove” that individual from the

9. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside.”).
10. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 §§ 301-309, ch. 477, 66
Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).
11. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”); INA § 310.
12. See INA § 291.
13. Id. § 274A.
14. See generally id. § 237 (listing classes of deportable alien).
15. See, e.g., id. § 237(a)(1)(C) (“Any alien who was admitted as a
nonimmigrant and who has failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status . . . is
deportable.”), (2)(A)(i) (“Any alien who (I) is convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of admission . . . is
deportable.”).
16. Id. § 212(a)(1)(A) (aliens with certain communicable diseases are
inadmissible), (2) (aliens with certain criminal histories are inadmissible), (3) (aliens
with terrorist connections are inadmissible), (4)(A) (aliens likely to become public
charges are inadmissible), (6)(A) (aliens who entered the United States unlawfully are
inadmissible), (9) (aliens with prior deportations or prior incidents of unlawful
presence are inadmissible).
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country. 17 The arresting officer may come into contact with the
noncitizen at a port of entry, while patrolling the border, or anywhere
within the United States. 18 The officer may charge the noncitizen as
subject to deportation for violating the terms of a lawful entry or simply
for lacking lawful immigration status. 19
The legal process to which the noncitizen is entitled varies greatly
based on the facts of the case. 20 In some cases, the noncitizen receives
nothing more than an interview with the arresting officer. 21 In other
situations, the noncitizen will have the benefit of a quasi-judicial
administrative proceeding before an immigration judge. 22 Depending
on the circumstances, the noncitizen may be held in civil detention for
the duration of the proceeding, which may last months to years. 23
17. See id. §§ 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (expeditious removal of certain aliens
“without further hearing or review”), 236(a) (arrest of aliens pending removal
proceedings), 238(a) (removal of criminal aliens), 239(a) (initiation of removal
proceedings).
18. Compare INA § 235(a)(1), with id. § 236(a).
19. See INA §§ 237(a) (grounds of deportability for alien previously admitted
but subject to removal), 212(a) (grounds of inadmissibility for alien seeking
admission).
20. Compare INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii) (allowing for expeditious “remov[al] from
the United States without further hearing or review” if a recently arrived alien without
entry documents does not express a fear of harm in country of origin), with id. § 240
(giving certain aliens the right to quasi-judicial administrative proceedings before an
immigration judge). Prior to the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), there was a clear division between
noncitizens on United States soil to whom the whole panoply of due process rights
was owed in formal deportation proceedings and those noncitizens who presented at
a port of entry and were entitled to much diminished process in exclusion proceedings.
IIRIRA merged the two and created a grey middle for those noncitizens who are
present in the United States but have not been admitted or paroled after inspection by
an immigration officer. Such unadmitted but present noncitizens, if recently, arrived
are entitled to limited rights when appearing before an immigration judge. INA §
235(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).
21. INA § 235(b); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (2019).
22. INA § 240; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1.
23. INA §§ 235(b)(2)(A) (“an alien seeking admission . . . shall be detained for
a proceeding under section [240 Removal Proceedings]”); 236(a) (allowing for
detention of the alien pending removal proceedings or release upon the posting of
bond or conditional parole). The Supreme Court has held there is a liberty interest at
stake for noncitizens detained by the immigration authorities. See, e.g., Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien
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Many noncitizens will be deported from the United States without
delay because they do not have lawful immigration status to enter or
remain in the country. 24 However, the law allows some noncitizens to
apply for specific remedies to avoid deportation. 25 Included among
those remedies are a number of humanitarian protections—
opportunities that Congress has legislated—to avoid deporting certain
noncitizens. Asylum is one such remedy, but it is not the only available
path to protection from deportation. 26 The law also protects certain
vulnerable noncitizens including, but not limited to, those who: (1) are
likely to suffer torture upon return to their country; 27 (2) have long
resided in the United States without immigration status but whose
deportation will cause exceptional harm to a qualifying U.S. citizen
relative; 28 (3) have suffered domestic violence perpetrated by a citizen
or permanent resident family member; 29 (4) have been victims of crime
or human trafficking; 30 (5) come from certain countries currently

would raise a serious constitutional problem.”). As at least some of the immigration
laws seem to allow indefinite detention, see INA § 235(b)(2)(A), it is perhaps not
surprising that some federal courts have read into the immigration law an implicit
right to consideration for release from detention after detention becomes prolonged.
See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that most
or all noncitizens in immigration detention have the right to a bond hearing after
detention becomes prolonged). The Supreme Court subsequently held, however, that
there is no implicit right to a bond hearing after immigration detention becomes
prolonged, but the constitutionality of the immigration law’s apparent authorization
of indefinite detention remains to be decided. Jennings v. Rodríguez, 138 S. Ct. 830,
876 (2018).
24. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i) (applying expedited removal to aliens inadmissible
simply for not having lawful entry documents).
25. Id. § 240(c)(4) (establishing requirements for applications for relief from
removal before an immigration judge).
26. Id. § 208(a) (allowing broad latitude in applying for asylum).
27. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16 (2019) (withholding of removal under the United
Nations Convention Against Torture), .17 (deferral of removal under the United
Nations Convention Against Torture).
28. INA § 240A(b)(1) (cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent
residents).
29. Id. § 240A(b)(2) (special rule cancellation of removal for battered spouse or
child).
30. Id. § 101(a)(15)(T) (victims of severe forms of human trafficking), (U)
(victims of other crimes who cooperate with law enforcement).
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experiencing the effects of natural disasters or civil unrest; 31 or (6) are
children who have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by their
parents. 32
The outcome of seeking any of these remedies, however, is never
guaranteed; and for many noncitizens placed in removal proceedings
there is no relief from removal available. 33 With limited exceptions,
immigration proceedings end in one of two ways: the noncitizen gets to
stay in the United States with lawful immigration status or the
noncitizen must leave. The latter is the more common outcome. 34
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL PROCESSING OF UACS
Unaccompanied Alien Children existed long before the term was
created. 35 Presumably, such children have interacted with the relevant
authorities for as long as modern immigration enforcement has existed.
But the definition of a UAC is much newer, having only been codified
in its current form in 2002. 36
Before discussing what it means to be a UAC, it is crucial to
understand what such a designation does not mean. UACs, like all
noncitizens, are subject to removal from the United States and
deportation to their country of nationality. 37 The mere fact of being a
noncitizen present but without lawful immigration status in the United
States is enough to earn UACs, even infants, one-way tickets back to
31. Id. § 244 (temporary protected status).
32. Id. § 101(a)(27)(J) (special immigrant juvenile classification).
33. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, STATISTICS YEARBOOK FISCAL YEAR 2017 14 figs.7 & 8 (2017),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1107056/download [hereinafter STATISTICS
YEARBOOK] (showing that orders of removal far outpace grants of immigration relief).
34. Id.
35. Ample popular sources, and a bronze statue, suggest that the first immigrant
processed through New York’s Ellis Island when it opened in 1892 was a teenager
who was likely unaccompanied. See Sam Roberts, Story of the First Through Ellis
TIMES
(Sept.
14,
2006),
Island
Is
Rewritten,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/14/nyregion/14annie.html.
36. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2), Pub. L. 107-296, tit. IV, § 462, 116 Stat. 2202
(2002).
37. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008 (TVPRA 2008) § 235(a)(5)(D)(i), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008)
(directing that UACs be placed in removal proceedings before an immigration judge).
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their countries of origin. 38 In other words, UAC classification alone
does not grant the child any substantive lawful immigration status in
the United States; instead, the classification affects how the child will
be processed through the immigration system and, possibly, the
remedies available to the child and how those remedies may be
accessed. 39
A. The Flores Litigation and Settlement
This discussion begins before being a “UAC” was even a legal
status, when a proto-UAC, Jenny Flores, a noncitizen child, sued the
United States government in 1985. 40 At the time, noncitizen children
arrested without their parents by immigration officers were treated not
dissimilarly than adults. 41 These children were detained by the same
officials who detained adults, and there were no special provisions for
them notwithstanding their inherent status as especially vulnerable
minors. 42 The Flores litigation sought to change that.
The litigation continued for years. Over a decade after the litigation
began, the government and plaintiffs agreed to a consent decree, which
became known as the Flores Settlement. 43 The agreement contains
many provisions, but its overall sentiment is especially noteworthy.

38. See, e.g., STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 33, at 33 (listing rates of in
absentia orders of removal for UACs as well as all other aliens in removal
proceedings).
39. See, e.g., TVPRA 2008, § 235(b), (c), (d).
40. Complaint at 5, Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (No.
85-4544 RJK(Px)) (suit brought by a noncitizen immigrant minor and similarly
situated individuals who were held in U.S. government custody pending deportation
proceedings, alleging inappropriate and unlawful treatment in the relevant processes).
41. Id. at 2-3 (“[Immigration officers] regularly place persons under the age of
eighteen (18) years under administrative arrest . . . . Like adults, juveniles arrested
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252 are entitled to release on bail while deportation proceedings
are conducted . . . . While in [immigration] detention, plaintiffs and those similarly
situated are required to share sleeping quarters with unrelated adults. Juveniles so
detained are provided no educational instruction, no educational or other reading
materials, and no supervised recreational activity. Plaintiffs and those similarly
situated are also denied reasonable visitation with family or friends.”).
42. Id.
43. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 2.
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The settlement disfavored the detention of children. 44 It set clear
limitations on how long noncitizen children, including UACs, could be
held in immigration custody for the simple sake of detention. 45 When
it was determined that a child could not be released to a family member,
the child would not remain in immigration custody but instead would
be shifted to the physical custody of a licensed program. 46 It required
the government to inform children of their rights and to allow children
to challenge their ongoing detention. 47 This shifted the focus of the
process of detaining UACs—they were no longer ordinary subjects of
detention but vulnerable children needing specialized care and
protection. 48
B. The Homeland Security Act of 2002
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 fundamentally reorganized the
federal government’s staffing of immigration enforcement (as well as a
host of other functions). 49 It shifted all responsibility for immigration
enforcement as well as the majority of responsibility for administrative
processing of immigration applications from the Department of
Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization Service to several subagencies of the newly-created Department of Homeland Security. 50
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also codified many of the
crucial elements of the Flores Settlement. 51 It also introduced an
additional federal agency into the world of immigration processing:
UACs would be held in the physical custody not of the immigration
44. Id. at 7 (“The [immigration authority] shall place each detained minor in the
least restrictive setting appropriate to the minor’s age and special needs, . . . and to
protect the minor’s well-being and that of others.”), 9-10 (“Where the [immigration
authority] determines that the detention of the minor is not required either to secure
his or her timely appearance before the [immigration authority] or the immigration
court, or to ensure the minor’s safety or that of others, the [immigration authority]
shall release a minor from its custody without unnecessary delay . . . .”).
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id. at 7.
48. See, e.g., id. at 11-12.
49. Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA 2002) §§ 411, 442, 451, 471, Pub. L.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
50. Id. § 456.
51. Id. § 462(b).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol50/iss1/3

10

Imbriano: From Humanitarian Crisis to Marauding Hordes: A Manufactured Outc
Imbriano camera ready (Do Not Delete)

1/15/2020 12:14 PM

2019] FROM HUMANITARIAN CRISIS TO MARAUDING HORDES

33

enforcement authorities but instead in the federal Department of Health
and Human Services. 52 While the act primarily focuses on transferring
functions to the newly-created department (from the Departments of
Treasury, Transportation, and Justice, among others), this is not the case
for the care and custody of UACs. 53 These provisions altered not only
who would be responsible for the task of detaining UACs, but also the
priorities of the federal government. The newly created priorities of the
federal government involve the child’s welfare during detention,
expeditious release from detention considering the child’s safety, and
the child’s access to independent counsel. 54
C. The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008
In 2008, Congress advanced protecting UACs a step further when
it promulgated the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act. This law primarily focused on protecting victims
and survivors of human trafficking, but it also implicitly recognized that
all UACs are vulnerable to human trafficking and thus require special
protection upon apprehension by federal immigration agents. 55
Crucially, apprehended UACs would be screened for indicators of
having been trafficked. 56
This law also refined how UACs would be processed. UACs must
be transferred to Health and Human Services’ custody within seventytwo hours of apprehension, and that agency then seeks to release each
UAC from custody to the care of a safe sponsor as soon as possible.57
Additionally, such children must be placed in formal administrative
removal proceedings before an immigration judge; they are not
expeditiously removed from the United States upon the unreviewable
decision of an immigration officer as occurs with noncitizen adults and
accompanied children. 58 But the law created an important exception: a
52. Id. § 462(a).
53. Compare id. § 462(a), with e.g., id. §§ 411, 421, 423, 441, 451(b).
54. Id. § 462(b)(1).
55. TVPRA 2008 § 235(a), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008).
56. See id. § 235(a)(4).
57. Id. § 235(b)(1), (3).
58. Compare INA § 235, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)), with TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(5)(D).
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UAC from a contiguous country (i.e., Mexico or Canada) can be
quickly repatriated to their country of origin but only if: (1) there are no
indications of human trafficking; (2) the child does not indicate a fear
of persecution in the home country or express an intent to apply for
asylum; and (3) the child has the capacity to choose to return to the
child’s country of origin. 59 If not all three of these requirements are
met—or if it cannot be determined within forty-eight hours that the
three requirements are met—the child will not be repatriated without
receiving all the benefits available to other UACs, including transfer to
Health and Human Services custody, consideration for release to a safe
sponsor, and formal removal proceedings before an immigration
judge. 60 The law also established important amendments to the laws
regarding UACs’ access to asylum and special immigrant juvenile
status, which will be discussed below.
D. The Current Definition of a UAC
Perhaps most importantly for this discussion, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 codified the definition of a UAC, and the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 reaffirmed
it. 61 Interestingly, the definition is not codified in Title 8 of the United
States Code, which relates generally to immigration and nationality, but
instead it is codified in Title 6, which relates to domestic security. The
protections available to UACs refer to the definition now found at
Section 279(g)(2) of Title 6 of the United States Code:
The term ‘‘unaccompanied alien child’’ means a child who—
(A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;
(B) has not attained 18 years of age; and
(C) with respect to whom—
(i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or
(ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available
to provide care and physical custody. 62

59. TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(2).
60. Id. § 235(a)(4).
61. HSA 2002 § 462(g)(2), Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); see also
TVPRA 2008 § 235(g).
62. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2), Pub. L. 107-296, tit. IV, § 462, 116 Stat. 2202 (2002).
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At first glance, this definition seems simple and straightforward.
Yet, its simplicity is misleading. Neither the definition itself nor the
sections that cross-reference it contain a temporal explanation; it is not
clear when the definition is considered and applied, when the relevant
protections attach, and when, if ever, such protections are lost. These
questions, as will be discussed below, have become crucial and have
allowed great leeway in decisions by the administration of how to
protect (or refuse to protect) UACs.
E. Proposed Regulations
As previously noted, many of the protections afforded to UACs—
especially those regarding their detention, care, and custody—have
their roots in the Flores Settlement. As modified in 2001, the settlement
and consent decree will terminate upon full adoption of its provisions
into law and regulation. 63 Yet, despite the passage of the laws discussed
above, litigants, including the United States government, continued to
recognize that the settlement provisions were binding; for years,
implementing regulations were not promulgated. 64 The Trump
administration has sought to change that.
In 2018, the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and
Human Services jointly published a notice of proposed rulemaking in
the Federal Register. 65 The proposal indicated an intention to enact
regulations implementing the settlement provisions, thereby
terminating the settlement agreement. 66 Advocates, not surprisingly,
expressed concern over the proposed regulations. 67 Given the track
63. Apprehension, Processing, Care, and Custody of Alien Minors and
Unaccompanied Alien Children, 83 Fed. Reg. 45,486, 45,486 (Sept. 7, 2018) (joint
proposed regulations by the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and
Human Services).
64. Id. at 45,487-88.
65. See generally id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Letter from Immigration & Nationality Law Comm., Children &
the Law Comm., Council on Children, Family Court & Family Law Comm., & Int’l
Human Rights Comm., N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n to Debbie Seguin, Assistant Dir., Office of
Policy, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 2 (Nov.
6, 2018) (“However, the Proposed Rules contravene the substance and purpose of the
[Flores Settlement Agreement], and their publication is therefore insufficient to
trigger the termination of the [Flores Settlement Agreement].”).
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record of the current administration of narrowing protections for UACs,
such concern appeared warranted.
On August 23, 2019, these two departments published the final rule
in the Federal Register. 68 The departments noted the concerns
expressed by various commenters and explained how the rules had been
amended after the notice and comment period. 69 As expected, the
administration stated that the publication of the final rule effectively
terminated the Flores agreement. 70 Advocates for UACs were quick to
disagree and plaintiffs’ counsel in the Flores litigation sought to have
the administration enjoined from implementing the final rule. 71 The
federal district judge presiding over the Flores litigation agreed that the
new regulations were inconsistent with the Flores agreement and
enjoined the government from implementation. 72 It is fair to assume
that this dispute is not settled.
III. WHO ARE THE UACS AND WHY ARE THEY ARRIVING?
UACs are, by no means, a homogenous group of children. UACs
hail from all corners of the world and speak hundreds of languages.
UACs include cisgender and transgender boys and girls and gendernonconforming children. 73 They range in age from days old to days
short of turning eighteen. Some have known significant economic
privilege while others left behind abject poverty; some have completed
secondary or even tertiary education while others have never seen a
classroom and cannot write their own names. In short, being a UAC
has nothing to do with a child’s identity but rather their transitory place

68. Apprehension, Processing, Care, and Custody of Alien Minors and
Unaccompanied Alien Children, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,392, 44,392 (Aug. 23, 2019) (joint
final regulations promulgated by the Departments of Homeland Security and Health
and Human Services).
69. Id. at 44,395-96.
70. See id. at 44,393.
71. See Order Re. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement and Defendants’
Notice of Termination of Settlement and Motion in the Alternative to Terminate
Flores Settlement Agreement at 1, Flores v. Barr, CV 85-4544-DMG (AGRx) (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 27, 2019).
72. Id. at 5, 24.
73. This article strives to use gender neutral pronouns.
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in the United States immigration system as tempered by their age,
custodial status, location in this country, and lack of immigration status.
That being said, there are some noteworthy demographic trends.
Statistically, the prototypical UAC is—and has been for years—a
Guatemalan male in his late teens. 74 But the last few years have seen
important and concerning demographic shifts. The percentage of
younger, arriving UACs has increased. 75 According to the Department
of Health and Human Services, in fiscal year 2012, only 11% of UACs
were age twelve and under; in fiscal year 2017, this number rose to
17%. 76 During that same period, the gender percentages of UACs
shifted: the percentage of girls rose from 23% to 32%. 77 These
percentages must be considered in light of the increased number of
UAC apprehensions during the last five years. Customs and Border
Protection reported that apprehensions of UACs increased from sixteen
thousand in fiscal year 2011 to a peak of over sixty-eight thousand in
fiscal year 2014. 78 The inherent increased vulnerability of younger
children is obvious. While travel to the United States is horrendously
dangerous for all immigrants, especially UACs, the prevalence of
gender-based violence, sexual assault, and rape adds an additional layer
of danger for girls. Tens of thousands of additional UACs traveling to
the United States per year thus means thousands of additional especially
vulnerable children.
There are some important caveats to this data. Statistics regarding
UACs—at least those published by Health and Human Services—
generally only include those children transferred to that agency. Since
Mexican (and Canadian) children are from contiguous countries and
thus can be quickly returned to countries of origin if there are no
indicators of human trafficking and they do not express a fear of return,
those children may well be arriving in large numbers but only the
fraction that are transferred to Health and Human Services are counted

74. FACTS AND DATA, supra note 4. See generally WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW (2017).
75. FACTS AND DATA, supra note 4 (comparing data on UACs ranging in age
between 0 to 12 years old).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. KANDEL, supra note 74, at 2.
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in government-published statistics on UACs. 79 It is also important to
note that UACs are not only children who have just arrived to the United
States. On the contrary, any noncitizen child found within the United
States, without immigration status, and not in the care of a parent is
classified as a UAC according to the plain language of the definition.
When a federal immigration agent performs enforcement activities
within the United States and encounters such a child, the officer must
follow the protocol to transfer the child to Health and Human Services
custody. As a practical matter, however, the vast majority of UACs
processed in recent years have been children who very recently arrived
to the United States and were encountered by immigration agents at the
ports of entry or near unauthorized border crossing points. 80
Each UAC has a personal story, and for those old enough to decide
to travel to the United States, they have their own reasons for coming.
Those who study UACs describe both push factors and pull factors. 81
Push factors are reasons in the country of origin that encourage an
individual to leave. 82 These factors may include a history of
victimization and violence as well as poverty. 83 Conversely, pull
factors are reasons in the United States that may encourage the journey
to this country, including the desire to reunify with family members
already resident in the United States or the promise of educational and
work opportunities. 84 While it is impossible and dangerously
irresponsible to look for the reason UACs are arriving to the United
States, it is important to see what may be driving changing trends. 85
79. Although noncitizen children may be arriving to the United States in large
numbers, those who are not transferred to the agency are not counted because in the
absence of indicators of human trafficking and expressed fear of return, they are
quickly repatriated. See TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(2).
80. See TOTAL MONTHLY UAC APPREHENSIONS, supra note 4 (noting
thousands of UACs apprehended at the southwest border but dozens at the coastal and
northern borders).
81. KANDEL, supra note 74, at 1.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See FRANK DE WAEGH, JESUIT CONFERENCE OF CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES, UNWILLING PARTICIPANTS: THE COERCION OF YOUTH INTO VIOLENT
CRIMINAL GROUPS IN CENTRAL AMERICA’S NORTHERN TRIANGLE 9 (2015) (“The
type of migration patterns currently occurring from the Northern Triangle resemble
displacement and migration typical of open conflicts, and as such illustrate the gravity
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Given that consistently over 80% of UACs have been nationals of three
countries in particular—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—and
that there was a monumental increase in the number of UACs arriving
from all of these countries at the same time, the shared stories of these
UACs in particular provides valuable insight. 86
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees did a
qualitative study of children fleeing these three countries (as well as
from Mexico). 87 Children were interviewed about life in their countries
of origin and their reasons for fleeing. 88 The resulting publication is
instructive and compelling, beginning with its very name: Children on
the Run. While children reported varied (and often multiple) reasons
for fleeing, “[t]wo overarching patterns of harm related to potential
international protection needs emerged: violence by organized armed
criminal actors and violence in the home.” 89 In other words, while
many of the children also wished to reunify with family members in the
United States or benefit from increased educational and work
opportunities, the majority were in fact fleeing their home countries.90
Other reports published by on-the-ground, non-governmental
organizations and think tanks confirm this reality. 91 These reports
confirm a near or complete breakdown of the state and the lawful
authority in these countries as well as a regularity of and impunity for
violence in the home and in the streets. 92 Central American children
of the phenomenon.”); SARNATA REYNOLDS, REFUGEES INT’L, “IT’S A SUICIDE ACT
TO LEAVE OR STAY”: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN EL SALVADOR 4-5 (2015)
(“massive numbers of Salvadoran youth and adults do not make the choice to leave
their homes but are instead forced out”).
86. See DE WAEGH, supra note 85, at 9 (“Beginning in 2011, the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) recorded a dramatic increase in the number of children
migrating without their parents or guardians and crossing into the United States from
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.”); see also REYNOLDS, supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
87. See Children on the Run, supra note 4.
88. Id. at 18-20.
89. Id. at 6.
90. Id. at 6-7, 23-29.
91. See DE WAEGH, supra note 85, at 9 (“In the Northern Triangle context,
forced migration must be understood as a last recourse to the threats and violence
exerted by maras.”); REYNOLDS, supra note 85, at 4-5.
92. See DE WAEGH, supra note 85, at 2 (“Weak state institutions struggle to limit
the power criminal groups exercise . . . and are often compromised by internal
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who have fled their home countries and arrived to the United States and
been classified as UACs have consistently reported being the victims of
domestic violence and/or gang violence. 93 As they sought refuge in the
United States, this has most often been the basis upon which UACs have
applied for permission to remain in the United States.
While UACs continue to arrive from all over the world, these
Central American children were and are the primary group of children
that the government, the media, and academics are referring to amid
current analysis of the UAC issue. 94 These are the children that
comprised the “surge” that the Obama administration called a
humanitarian crisis and scrambled to house in sufficient and appropriate
facilities. 95 And these are the children who have been called gang
members, drug mules, and terrorists during the Trump administration.96
IV. SPECIFIC PROTECTIONS AND LEGAL REMEDIES FOR UACS AND
THEIR RECENT LIMITATIONS
The mere fact of being classified as—or meeting the definition of—
a UAC does not grant the child any legal immigration status in the
United States. On the contrary, each year thousands of UACs are
ordered deported from the United States by immigration judges.97
However, being a UAC does give the child special protections and
special access to immigration remedies that are not available to other
noncitizens, whether adults or accompanied children. 98 The most

corruption or outright complicity with illicit actors.”); REYNOLDS, supra note 85, at 5
(“[T]he constant insecurity experienced by so many in El Salvador is a direct
demonstration of the state’s unwillingness and/or inability to protect some of its
citizens from torture and persecution.”).
93. Children on the Run, supra note 4, at 31-39.
94. See, e.g., KANDEL, supra note 74, at 2.
95. Id. at 1 (“Some Members of Congress as well as the Obama Administration
have characterized the issue as a humanitarian crisis.”); see also Hull, supra note 3.
96. See Kim, supra note 3.
97. See, e.g., STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 33, at 14 figs.7 & 8 (showing
that orders of removal far outpace grants of immigration relief); see also KANDEL,
supra note 74, at 12.
98. See, e.g., TVPRA 2008 § 235(d), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077
(2008) (establishing “permanent” protections for certain children, including primarily
UACs).
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important of these protections, and their recent modifications, will be
addressed below.
A. Release from Federal Detention
The legal process to deport noncitizens from the United States
occurs through civil proceedings. Regardless of the reason the
government seeks to deport a noncitizen—even if the reason is the
noncitizen’s criminal history—the decision to deport the individual is a
civil determination, not a criminal penalty. 99 The law generally
allows—and in some instances requires—that the noncitizen will be
detained in civil detention during the course of those proceedings. 100
The Department of Homeland Security—acting as arresting officer,
jailer, and prosecutor—has broad discretion over whether a noncitizen
is detained during removal proceedings before an immigration judge. 101
It is almost always within the department’s discretion to decide whether
a noncitizen should be detained. 102 If a noncitizen is detained, the
individual may have a right to challenge that determination and seek to
be released upon posting bond. 103 But in certain situations, including
in the case of a noncitizen asylum seeker who lawfully seeks admission
to the United States at a port of entry to seek protection, the noncitizen
currently has no right to challenge the department’s custody
determination. 104 That asylum seeker may be required to spend months
or years in civil detention while fighting for asylum. 105
The Flores Settlement solidified the concept that this process
should not apply to immigrant children. 106 It implemented a
presumption that children should be held in the least restrictive setting

99. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
100. INA §§ 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 236(a), (c), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).
101. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (2019).
102. Id.
103. INA § 236(a).
104. Id. § 235(b)(1)(A)(i); cf. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089-90
(9th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded to Jennings v. Rodríguez, 138 S. Ct. 830
(2018).
105. See Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1089-90; see also sources cited supra note 23.
106. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 7.
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that ensures the safety of both the child and the community. 107 This
process and presumption was codified by both the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2008. 108 Further, the child shall be released to the care of a sponsor—
a family member residing in the United States, a non-relative
responsible adult, or even a community organization—when it is
determined that the sponsor will provide proper care for the child. 109
There are some very important details about this process. If the
government decides to detain the child in a secure facility, that decision
must be justified and reviewed every thirty days. 110 Release from
government custody does not grant the child status to remain in the
United States. 111 On the contrary, the child will remain in active
removal proceedings that may eventually result in an order of
deportation. 112 The child need not post bond in order to be released
from custody, but the child’s sponsor is required to provide adequate
assurances that the child will appear for court hearings. 113 The
consequence for failing to appear—an immediate order of deportation
in absentia—applies to UACs just as it does to adults and accompanied
children. 114 UACs may not be released on their own recognizance. 115
If a UAC turns eighteen while in government custody, the law mandates
the child be considered for release from government custody, rather
than immediately be detained with other adult immigrant detainees. 116
To fulfill this judicial and statutory framework, the Department of
Health and Human Services has contracted with a network of private
107. Id.
108. HSA 2002 § 462(b)(1)(C), (b)(2), Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002);
TVPRA 2008 § 235(c)(1)-(3), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008).
109. See TVPRA 2008 § 235(c)(2)-(3); see also Stipulated Settlement
Agreement, supra note 2, at 10.
110. TVPRA 2008 § 235(c)(2).
111. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 7 (release of UAC
contingent upon assurances of appearing for removal proceedings); TVPRA 2008 §
235(c)(2) (“risk of flight” is a factor in determining suitability of sponsor for release).
112. TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(5)(D).
113. HSA 2002 § 462(b)(2)(A)(i); TVPRA 2008 § 235(f)(2)(B).
114. INA § 240(b)(5)(A), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).
115. HSA 2002 § 462(b)(2)(B).
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B) (2018).
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agencies to provide care for these children. 117 While private, for-profit
corporations often perform contracted services for adult immigrant
detention, not-for-profit agencies that focus on child welfare are the
primary (though not exclusive) providers of care and custody for
detained UACs. 118 The vast majority of UACs are housed in facilities
labeled “shelters”; while these children are not quite free to leave, they
are not in jail cells or shackled. 119 Being cared for in a shelter means a
determination has been made that the child does not present a risk to
themselves or others and will be detained only until a suitable sponsor
has been identified and vetted. 120
The government and its contractors are required to begin searching
for an appropriate sponsor the moment a UAC is placed in custody. 121
There is a hierarchy of potential sponsors: parents; other close adult
relatives, including siblings, aunts and uncles, grandparents, cousins;
unrelated adults, including family friends; and community
organizations. 122 Sponsors must demonstrate they will provide a safe
home for the child, however, sponsors are not required to demonstrate
they have lawful immigration status in the United States. 123 Over the
last several years, a large portion of the UACs in government custody
had parents living in the United States who willingly accepted their
children into their homes. 124
117. See, e.g., Kim Barker, Nicholas Kulish, & Rebecca R. Ruiz, He’s Built an
Empire, with Detained Migrant Children as the Bricks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/02/us/southwest-key-migrant-children.html.
118. See id.; see generally Livia Luan, Profiting from Enforcement: The Role of
Private Prisons in U.S. Immigration Detention, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (May 2,
2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/profiting-enforcement-role-privateprisons-us-immigration-detention.
119. See KANDEL, supra note 74, at 8 n.45.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 8 (“The same care providers also facilitate the release of UAC to
family members or other sponsors who are able to care for them.”); see also Stipulated
Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 9-10 (general policy favoring release).
122. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 10.
123. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERV., CHILDREN ENTERING THE UNITED STATES UNACCOMPANIED § 2.6 (Jan. 30,
2015) [hereinafter CHILDREN ENTERING THE UNITED STATES UNACCOMPANIED]
(“ORR does not disqualify potential sponsors on the basis of their immigration
status.”).
124. See KANDEL, supra note 74, at 10 n.51.
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Although lawful immigration status is not a requirement for
sponsoring a UAC, in choosing to sponsor a child out of federal custody
the sponsor must still provide crucial personal information to the
government, including name, address, and telephone number. 125 In
some cases, the sponsor must agree to a home study, background check,
and ongoing supervision after the child is released. 126
In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security released several
memoranda specifying the government’s priorities for immigration
enforcement. 127 The government focused its enforcement operations
on noncitizens who, in addition to lacking lawful immigration status,
had a criminal history or otherwise presented a threat to the
community. 128 Immigration officers and prosecutors were granted
discretion to not seek removal of noncitizens who lacked lawful
immigration status but were otherwise law-abiding members of the
community with positive equities. 129 The government shifted its stance
in 2017, declaring that while it would continue to prioritize the
deportation of noncitizens with criminal histories, now any noncitizen
without lawful immigration status would not be immune from adverse
immigration enforcement activities. 130 As such, it suddenly became
much more risky for a noncitizen without lawful immigration status to
provide their personal information to the government and serve as a
sponsor for a UAC.
At least two additional policy changes directly disincentivized
sponsoring a UAC. Health and Human Services announced it entered
into an information sharing agreement with Homeland Security; the
information collected during the vetting process of a potential sponsor
125. Id. at 9; see CHILDREN ENTERING THE UNITED STATES UNACCOMPANIED,
supra note 123, § 2.5.1 (noting that immigration status checks are run on sponsors
through the Department of Homeland Security).
126. TVPRA 2008 § 235(c)(3)(B), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077
(2008).
127. Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
to
All
ICE
Employees
(Mar.
2,
2011),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/civil-imm-enforcementpriorities_app-detn-reml-aliens.pdf (regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement:
Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens).
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. See Exec. Order, No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017)
(“Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States”).
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would now be available to the immigration enforcement authority. 131
Contemporaneously, Health and Human Services “imposed expanded
fingerprinting requirements to cover all sponsors and their household
members.” 132 Again, this meant the government collected even more
personal information from the sponsors. Reports of immigration agents
targeting UAC sponsors soon began to appear.
The Trump administration retracted the expanded fingerprinting
policy after it prompted advocacy and at least one lawsuit. 133 Following
these policy changes, there was a significant increase in the length of
time the average UAC remained in government custody. 134 It is
reasonable to assume that the longer average time in care meant either
fewer sponsors were willing to come forward or a reticence to provide
the required information to the government. As noted below, detention
fatigue might also mean more children abandoning their claims for
protection and requesting repatriation.
B. Limiting UACs’ Eligibility for Asylum
While asylum is an ancient concept, its current legal structure was
designed by the international community in 1951 with the adoption of
the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees. 135 In 1980,
the United States incorporated the new international definition of a

131. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC’Y., & U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (Apr. 13, 2018) (regarding Consultation and
Information Sharing in Unaccompanied Alien Child Matters).
132. See Class Complaint and Petition for Habeas Corpus at 8, Duchitanga v.
Lloyd, No. 1:18-cv-10332 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 2018).
133. See Jason Grant, Trump Administration Changes Fingerprint Check Policy
for Immigration Sponsors, N.Y. L.J., (Dec. 19, 2018).
134. Compare FACTS AND DATA, supra note 4 (showing current average time a
UAC is in care is sixty days), with KANDEL, supra note 74, at 10 (noting that by
January 2016, average time in care had dropped to thirty-four days). See Class
Complaint and Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 132, at 9 (“The recent changes
in fingerprint policies have dramatically increased how long children must wait for
release.”).
135. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
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refugee into domestic immigration law. 136 That definition is the basis
upon which a noncitizen may be accepted for resettlement in the United
States as a refugee or may seek asylum in the United States upon
arrival. 137 Children, just like adults, may seek asylum, but UACs have
special access to this status.
Federal law provides preferential treatment for UACs when they
choose to apply for asylum. Unlike other noncitizens subject to
deportation, including accompanied children—who may only apply for
asylum in adversarial quasi-judicial proceedings before an immigration
judge—UACs are given an initial opportunity to make their case for
asylum in a non-adversarial, non-judicial setting, a process intuitively
preferable for traumatized, fleeing children. 138 Federal law also
exempts UACs from the strict requirement that an asylum application
be filed within one year of arrival to the United States and from the
requirement that an asylum applicant first seek asylum in certain other
countries. 139 Since 2013, the Obama administration allowed these
benefits to flow to UACs relatively generously. 140 By contrast, several
Trump administration officials have declared these opportunities
should be strictly limited. 141 Moreover, the Attorney General’s recent
unilateral decision to restrict immigration judges’ authority to grant
asylum on substantive grounds severely limited UACs’ ability to access
asylum protection in the United States. 142
136. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (Mar. 17, 1980).
137. See INA § 208(b)(1)(A), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)) (defining asylum eligibility by crossreferencing INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (definition of refugee)).
138. INA § 208(b)(3)(C); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9(b), 208.14(c) (2019).
139. INA § 208(a)(2)(E).
140. See Memorandum from Ted Kim, Acting Chief, Asylum Division, U.S.
Citizen and Immigration Services, to All Asylum Office Staff 2 (May 28, 2013)
[hereinafter Kim Memo 2013] (directing that the asylum office will accept a prior
determination by CBP or ICE that an applicant is an unaccompanied alien child and
will assume jurisdiction).
141. See Memorandum from Jean King, General Counsel, Exec. Office for
Immigration Review, to James R. McHenry III, Acting Director, Exec. Office for
Immigration Review 9 (Sept. 19, 2017) [hereinafter King Memo 2017] (Legal
Opinion re: EOIR’s Authority to Interpret the Term Unaccompanied Alien Child for
Purposes of Applying Certain Provisions of the TVPRA); see also, e.g., Matter of
Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271, 278-79 n.4 (A.G. 2018).
142. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018).
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1. Statutory Asylum Protections for UACs
Congress recognized that UACs require special protections when
applying for asylum. Accordingly, it legislated:
Applications for asylum and other forms of relief from removal in
which an unaccompanied alien child is the principal applicant shall
be governed by regulations which take into account the specialized
needs of unaccompanied alien children and which address both
procedural and substantive aspects of handling unaccompanied alien
children’s cases. 143

While Congress gave federal agencies discretion in the rulemaking
process to develop such regulations, some considerations were so
important that Congress incorporated them into the law. 144
a. Initial Jurisdiction over UACs’ Asylum Applications
In the United States, there are generally two ways to apply for
asylum, which are commonly referred to as affirmative and defensive
applications. A noncitizen present in the United States—with or
without lawful immigration status and not currently defending against
deportation—may affirmatively apply for asylum. 145 An affirmative
asylum application is adjudicated by an asylum officer through a
private, informal, and non-adversarial interview. 146 If the officer grants
asylum, there is no appeal, and the new asylee is on a path to lawful
permanent residence and eventual citizenship. 147 If the officer declines
to grant asylum, in most situations the officer will institute removal
proceedings against the noncitizen applicant, thereby requiring the
applicant to appear before an immigration judge to defend against
deportation. 148 The noncitizen will then have the opportunity to renew
the application for asylum before the immigration judge for de novo

143. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(8), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008).
144. See generally id. § 235(d)(7).
145. INA § 208, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).
146. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2019).
147. Id. §§ 208.14(b), 209.2(a).
148. Id. § 208.14(c)(1).
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consideration, albeit in a formal, adversarial, administrative trial.149
From the judge’s decision, an appeal may be taken to the administrative
appellate body—the Board of Immigration Appeals—and possibly to
the corresponding federal circuit court for further review. 150 The risk
of affirmatively applying for asylum is great because if unsuccessful,
the applicant will have to defend against deportation. But, in doing so,
the applicant gets two opportunities—first affirmatively, then
defensively—to seek asylum with the first instance being conducted in
a less intimidating environment more suitable for a survivor of
persecution or torture.
A noncitizen who is already defending against deportation does not
have this first opportunity to seek asylum affirmatively with an asylum
officer. Rather, once the noncitizen is apprehended and removal
proceedings are commenced, the only opportunity to seek asylum will
be in a defensive posture before the immigration judge. 151 Therefore,
these asylum applicants are limited to one opportunity to request
asylum, which is only done in the adversarial, trial-court setting. If a
noncitizen who is already in removal proceedings tries to apply for
asylum with the asylum officer, the officer will generally lack
jurisdiction over the application. 152
There is an inherent great benefit to being able to seek asylum
through the affirmative (and then, if necessary, defensive) process.
Most UACs, however, are apprehended upon or soon after entry to the
United States and would never have such an opportunity. Recognizing
the value of the affirmative process, especially for exceptionally
vulnerable applicants such as UACs, Congress mandated that UACs get
the benefit of this initial opportunity to seek asylum notwithstanding
prior initiation of removal proceedings. 153 The Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 provided, “An asylum
officer . . . shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application

149. See id.; Id. § 1240.10.
150. Id. §§ 1240.15, 1003.1(b)(3); INA § 242(a)(2)(B) (generally denying
judicial jurisdiction to review immigration decisions but maintain judicial jurisdiction
over asylum denials).
151. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2(b), 1208.2(b).
152. See sources cited supra note 151.
153. INA § 208(b)(3)(C).
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filed by [a UAC].” 154 In other words, all UAC asylum applicants get
two bites at the apple. While the immigration judge may continue to
schedule hearings, the plain language of the act suggests that the judge
must take no action on an asylum application unless and until the
asylum officer has exercised initial adjudicatory responsibility.
While the statutory provision makes clear that jurisdiction vests
when the asylum application is filed, it does not answer the question of
when UAC status is determined. It is plausible to presume that UAC
status is determined at the time of the filing of the application, but this
is perhaps the narrowest reading of the statute. It is also plausible to
presume that UAC status is determined upon apprehension or even
upon entry to the United States. From 2008 until 2013, the approach to
this interpretation was unclear. Then, in 2013, an administrative
directive was issued: in general, the UAC status determination made at
the time of first contact with the immigration authorities controls.155
The directive ordered asylum officers to continue to treat the asylum
applicant as a UAC if the asylum applicant had previously been found
by an immigration officer to be a UAC and that determination had not
been rescinded. 156 On the other hand, if the applicant had not
previously come into contact with an immigration officer, the asylum
officer must consider the details of the child’s life at the time the asylum
application was filed. 157 This allowed UACs to continue to benefit
from the initial jurisdiction provision of the statute. The directive was
to be followed even if a UAC had turned eighteen or had been released
from government custody to a parent or legal guardian before an asylum
application was filed. Accordingly, the asylum officer would continue
to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the application on the merits based on
the individual having been classified as a UAC at the time of
apprehension. 158
In 2018, while this directive was still in effect, the general counsel
of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (the administrative
agency within the Department of Justice that houses both the
154. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(7)(B), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077
(2008) (emphasis added).
155. Kim Memo 2013, supra note 140, at 2.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2-3.
158. See id. at 2.
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immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals) sent a
memorandum to that agency’s director regarding UAC status
determinations. 159 The memorandum argued that immigration judges
should determine whether a noncitizen appearing before them meets the
definition of a UAC at that moment and determine, accordingly,
whether the court should adjudicate any application for asylum in the
first instance rather than allowing the asylum officer an initial
opportunity to adjudicate the case. 160
Several months later, Attorney General Sessions exercised a power
vested in him as the ultimate administrative interpreter of immigration
law. 161 Since all administrative authority exercised by immigration
judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals is technically authority
delegated to them by the Attorney General, the Attorney General may
certify any pending immigration case to himself to review and issue a
precedential decision binding on the immigration courts and the Board
of Immigration Appeals (as well as on asylum officers and other
immigration adjudicators within the Department of Homeland
Security). 162 This first decision issued by Attorney General Sessions in
the exercise of this authority will be discussed further below.
Importantly, though, he included a footnote that referenced his clear
opinion that UAC status is not static. He suggested, without deciding,
that a (former) UAC loses such status (and the attendant protections)
upon reaching age eighteen (and perhaps upon release from government
custody to a sponsor). 163
159. See King Memo 2017, supra note 140.
160. Id. at 3-6.
161. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2019).
162. Id. § 1003.1(g)(1); see also INA § 103(a)(1), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)) (“determination and
ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be
controlling”). These decisions are binding on asylum officers and other immigration
adjudicators within the Department of Homeland Security as well. Id.
163. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271, 279 n.4 (A.G. 2018). The
Attorney General makes a vague reference to whether the UAC in that case ceased to
be a UAC upon release from government custody to his brother-in-law. Id. While this
speculative comment lacks sufficient evidentiary detail for evaluation, it appears the
Attorney General has failed to consider the plain language of contrary federal law.
See TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(5), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008) (“A
department or agency of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State court
or juvenile court located in the United States, acting in loco parentis, shall not be

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol50/iss1/3

28

Imbriano: From Humanitarian Crisis to Marauding Hordes: A Manufactured Outc
Imbriano camera ready (Do Not Delete)

1/15/2020 12:14 PM

2019] FROM HUMANITARIAN CRISIS TO MARAUDING HORDES

51

Not long thereafter, the Board of Immigration Appeals—by
definition, subordinate and beholden to the Attorney General—issued a
precedential opinion directly on point. 164 In Matter of M-A-C-O-, it
considered the case of a young noncitizen who clearly had been a UAC
but turned eighteen prior to filing his asylum application with the
asylum officer. 165 The Board of Immigration Appeals held the
immigration judge properly found that jurisdiction over any asylum
application rested only with the immigration court. 166 While no
precedential decision has yet held that a UAC released to a parent is
also limited to seeking asylum before an immigration judge, such a
holding is presumably within the realm of possibility.
Then, in May 2019, a new administrative directive was issued to
asylum officers. This memorandum, rescinding the 2013 directive,
instructed asylum officers to consider whether the asylum applicant was
a UAC at the time of filing the application. 167 If the child did not meet
all criteria for being a UAC at the time the application was filed—
regardless of prior UAC status—the asylum officer would lack
jurisdiction. 168 Litigation followed quickly, and the government is
currently enjoined from applying the new directive. 169
Although the last directive is currently stayed, those administration
officials nonetheless wiped away five years of otherwise settled
processing of UAC asylum applications. The effects of these decisions
are devastating. Many young noncitizens will not only be limited to
one opportunity to seek asylum but more crucially will have to tell their
stories of fear, persecution, and torture in open court subject to crossexamination by both an immigration prosecutor and an immigration
considered a legal guardian for purposes of this section or section 462 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 279).”).
164. 8 C.F.R 1003.1(a)(1) (“There shall be . . . a Board of Immigration
Appeals . . . appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney General’s
delegates in the cases that come before them.”).
165. Matter of M-A-C-O-, 27 I&N Dec. 477, 477 (BIA 2018).
166. Id. at 479.
167. Memorandum from John Lafferty, Chief, Asylum Division, to All Asylum
Office Staff 1 (May 31, 2019) (regarding Updated Procedures for Asylum
Applications filed by Unaccompanied Alien Children).
168. Id.
169. Order at 1, J.O.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 8:19-cv-01944GJH (D. Md. Aug. 2, 2019).
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judge rather than within a non-adversarial interview. 170 Presumably,
Congress had reasons to allow such children to seek asylum in the first
instance before asylum officers. Many of these young people, without
the benefit of the protections Congress intended them to have, will be
unable to adequately express themselves and receive the protections the
law has afforded them.
b. Exemption from the Statutory Deadline
Congress tempered the international definition of asylum by adding
a strict filing deadline: an asylum applicant must file the application
within one year of their last arrival to the United States. 171 While there
are some very limited exceptions, failure to timely file the application
generally renders the noncitizen statutorily ineligible for asylum. 172
Simply not being aware of the filing deadline is not an excuse.173
Noncitizens who miss the statutory deadline may still seek protection
from deportation if they are more likely than not to be persecuted or
tortured upon deportation, but those protections are greatly limited.174
While a noncitizen granted asylum is on a path to permanent residence
and eventual citizenship and may immigrate their spouse and children,
a noncitizen who misses the filing deadline but proves they will be
persecuted or tortured is likely to only have their deportation withheld
or deferred. 175 These individuals will never receive permanent

170. Compare INA § 240(b)(1), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)) (allowing the immigration judge to
“interrogate, examine, and cross-examine” the noncitizen), and 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(a)
(2019) (empowering government counsel to conduct “interrogation, examination, and
cross-examination” of the noncitizen), with 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (“The asylum officer
shall conduct the interview in a non-adversarial manner.”).
171. INA § 208(a)(2)(B).
172. See id.; 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a), 1208.4(a).
173. Cf. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a) (defining “extraordinary circumstances” and
“changed circumstances”), 1208.4(a) (similarly defining “extraordinary
circumstances” and “changed circumstances”).
174. See INA § 241(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16.
175. Compare INA § 241(b)(3) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16, with 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)
(allowing noncitizen granted asylum to seek lawful permanent residence).
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residence or citizenship and will never be able to immigrate their spouse
and children. 176 In other words, meeting the filing deadline is crucial.
Congress realized failure to comply with the statutory filing
deadline carried extremely harsh consequences for vulnerable UACs.
Accordingly, in 2008, Congress exempted UACs from the statutory
filing deadline. 177 UACs do not, as the regulations falsely suggest, need
to prove that their unaccompanied minor status should constitute an
exception to the filing deadline because they need not prove a factspecific exception. 178 Rather, the deadline simply does not apply.179
This makes intuitive sense. To expect children, including children of
very tender age, who are without the protection of a parent or legal
guardian to not only know that they must apply for asylum but to
successfully do so within one year of arrival to the United States would
be absurd.
To that end, ever since asylum officers received guidance in 2013
as to UACs, the officers did not need to consider the date of filing as
long as the child had previously been classified as a UAC by another
immigration official. 180 The decisions and memoranda discussed above
suggest that UAC classification is not static. This means when a former
UAC is no longer a UAC, the one-year filing deadline will
automatically apply. 181 If this is the case, noncitizen young people
might find themselves having lost the opportunity to apply for asylum
altogether. Congress did not legislate that being a UAC tolls the oneyear filing deadline but simply said that the one-year filing deadline
does not apply to UACs. 182 As such, there is no clarity as to how the
one-year filing deadline should be applied to a former UAC. It is not
clear that Congress even conceptualized the idea of a former UAC.

176. Cf. INA § 208(b)(3)(A) (allowing asylum status for spouse and children of
noncitizen granted asylum); 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(a) (similarly allowing asylum status
for spouse and children of noncitizen granted asylum).
177. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(7)(A), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077
(2008).
178. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a)(5)(ii), 1208.4(a)(5)(ii); INA § 208(a)(2)(E).
179. INA § 208(a)(2)(E).
180. Kim Memo 2013, supra note 140, at 2-3.
181. King Memo 2017, supra note 141, at 8.
182. Cf. id. (proffering tolling to prevent mooting asylum eligibility for former
UACs).
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Here, hypothetical situations are illustrative. Imagine a seventeenand-a-half-year-old UAC and a sixteen-and-a-half-year-old UAC who
both arrive to the United States. Each marvelously becomes a fully
competent adult on their eighteenth birthday and, the next day, files
their asylum application. If they are still considered UACs, neither has
a problem with the one-year filing deadline because the deadline does
not apply to UACs. However, if on their eighteenth birthday, they were
no longer considered UACs, the older of the two children would not be
hindered by the one-year filing deadline (they applied six months and a
day after arrival) while the younger child would be statutorily barred
(having applied eighteen months and a day after arrival). The same
would be true of a child who arrived when only three years old and
applied days after their eighteenth birthday. It makes intuitive sense
that the child who arrived younger (and thus was more vulnerable as an
even younger child without parental care) should have greater access to
protection, not less. It is true that both the sixteen-year-old and threeyear-old could seek an exception to the one-year filing deadline, but it
is legally problematic to restrict such children to a possible regulatory
exception when Congress clearly created a statutory exemption.
Application of this provision becomes even more unreasonable if a
UAC released to a parent is no longer a UAC. By statute, the
government must determine whether a receiving sponsor could provide
a safe placement for the child and must conduct a home study when
necessary. 183 It is possible that a UAC remains in government custody
for a year before placement is approved. Should this happen, and
should such a UAC be released to a parent, their statutory opportunity
to seek asylum could expire retroactively to the period while the UAC
was in government custody. Although there is no prohibition on the
child filing the asylum application while in government custody, it
would presumably become incumbent upon the custodian—the United
States government—to ensure the application is filed. This seems like
a responsibility the government would be unwilling to assume.
These concerns could be quelled if the one-year filing deadline is
tolled during the time a child remains a UAC, but that is not what
Congress legislated. 184 Tolling is not the same as an exemption, and
183. TVPRA 2008 § 235(c)(3)(B), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077
(2008).
184. See King Memo 2017, supra note 141, at 8.
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there is no basis to assume Congress intended tolling. But, if the oneyear filing deadline begins to apply to (former) UACs, many of them
will still encounter severe consequences. Unlike eliminating initial
jurisdiction and adjudication by the asylum officer, this change will not
simply shift adjudication to a different (adversarial and more
intimidating) adjudicator. Rather, it will completely undermine
statutory asylum eligibility before any adjudicator. As a result,
minors—who in nearly any other legal context would be found legally
incompetent—will find themselves suffering the consequences of
missing statutory deadlines to apply for asylum.
c. Exemption from Safe Third Country Bar
The third specific protection Congress created for UACs applying
for asylum also relates to a statutory bar to asylum: potential return to a
safe third country. By law, an asylum applicant is ineligible for asylum
if they can be removed to a “safe” country with which the United States
has entered into a bilateral or multilateral agreement by which that
country will adjudicate the asylum claim. 185 Just as the one-year filing
deadline does not apply to UACs, this prohibition does not apply to
UACs as a matter of law. 186 Thus, a UAC will not be barred from
seeking asylum in the United States simply because the United States
has entered into agreements with other countries regarding those
countries’ willingness to process asylum seekers transferred to them
from the United States. UACs losing this exemption is yet another
factor that will statutorily limit their access to asylum.
Until very recently, this limitation was primarily theoretical. For
many years, the United States had only one such bilateral agreement;
the agreement is with Canada and it only applies to those asylum
seekers who entered the United States from Canada (or entered Canada
from the United States). 187 However, there have been proposals
185. INA § 208(a)(2)(A), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).
186. Id. § 208(a)(2)(E).
187. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the United States of America for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status
Claims from Nationals of Third Countries, Canada-U.S., Dec. 5, 2002, GLOBAL
AFFAIRS
CANADA
(Mar.
3,
2014),
https://www.treatyaccord.gc.ca/details.aspx?id=104943 (agreement covering third-country asylum
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regarding adoption of such a bilateral agreement with Mexico.188 In
January 2019, the government announced that while the United States
had not yet signed a safe third country agreement with Mexico, adult
asylum seekers arriving by land via Mexico would now be required to
await their removal proceedings in Mexico. 189 Although this new
policy does not apply to UACs, it is reasonable to expect that the
government intends to enter into a bilateral, safe third country
agreement. More recently, the United States has entered into bilateral
agreements with El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras that would
allow the United States to send asylum seekers to any of those
countries. 190 None of those agreements require the asylum seeker to
have passed through the receiving country (as does the agreement with
Canada) and none explicitly excludes UACs from applicability. 191 If
these agreements can be applied to (former) UACs, virtually all UACs
would find themselves ineligible to apply for asylum in the United
States. Given the recent increase in the number of children fleeing
claims at the border). It is noteworthy, however, that the agreement as written and in
effect exempts unaccompanied minors. Id. art. 4.
188. Joshua Partlow & Nick Miroff, U.S. and Mexico Discussing a Deal That
Could Slash Migration at the Border, WASH. POST (July 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-and-mexico-discussing-adeal-that-could-slash-migration-at-the-border/2018/07/10/34e68f72-7ef2-11e8-a63f7b5d2aba7ac5_story.html.
189. See Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland
Security, to L. Francis Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv.; Kevin K.
McAleenan, Comm’r., U.S. Customs & Border Protection; Ronald D. Vitiello,
Deputy Dir. & Senior Official Performing the Duties of Dir., U.S. Immigration &
Customs
Enforcement
2
(Jan.
25,
2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrantprotection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf (regarding Policy Guidance for
Implementation of Migrant Protection Protocols).
190. See Agreement on Cooperation Regarding Examination of Protection
Claims, U.S.-Guat., art. 3, July 26, 2019, FEDERAL REGISTER (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/11/20/2019-25288/agreementbetween-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-ofthe-republic; Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Examination of Protection
Claims, U.S.-El Sal., art. 3, Sept. 20, 2019, FEDERAL REGISTER (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/11/19/2019-25137/implementingbilateral-and-multilateral-asylum-cooperative-agreements-under-the-immigrationand; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACT SHEET: DHS AGREEMENTS
WITH GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND EL SALVADOR (Oct. 3, 2019).
191. See sources cited supra note 186.
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El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, this proposition
understandably raises serious concerns about its reasonableness and
safety. 192
2. Substantive Eligibility in Common UAC Asylum Claims
Recent legal developments regarding the substantive eligibility for
asylum are even more harmful to UACs seeking protection. Asylum
law is both strict and harsh; there is perhaps no issue within immigration
law that is more litigated—and with more disparate judicial conclusions
across the various federal circuits—than who qualifies for asylum and
why.
Noncitizens may meet the definition of a refugee and thereby
qualify for asylum if they fear grave harm on account of their identity—
specifically their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group. 193 Developing as it did at the
conclusion of the Second World War, it is not surprising that the
international community was not focused on protecting individuals who
feared randomized harm but rather peoples who were in specific,
targeted danger. Tomes of judicial decisions have been written to
explain precisely who fits within this very narrow definition. Notably,
gender is not included among the grounds that give rise to asylum
eligibility.
Notwithstanding a straight forward comment by the Board of
Immigration Appeals in its first instructive asylum decision back in
1985 that gender would provide a basis for asylum, the Board of
Immigration Appeals and immigration judges spent the following three
decades denying asylum to noncitizens who had suffered gender-based
harm. 194 Applicant after applicant credibly testified to the horrendous
suffering endured on account of their gender, often within the context

192. See, e.g., Children on the Run, supra note 4, at 37-39 (describing unique
dangers suffered by children fleeing Mexico).
193. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).
194. Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (“The shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex. . . . ”); Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec.
316, 318-19 (A.G. 2018) (previously decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals
and reviewed by the Attorney General).
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of an abusive domestic relationship, but their cases were denied. 195 The
facts of one such denied case were so egregious that the Attorney
General at the time vacated the denial and directed that regulations be
promulgated to allow such cases to be granted; 196 two decades later,
those regulations remain pending. 197 The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees—the international interpreter of the
international law upon which U.S. asylum law is formed—has found
gender indeed fits within the protection framework. 198 In line with this
interpretation, federal circuit courts directed the Board of Immigration
Appeals to fix its analysis and try again, but on remand such cases were
quietly resolved without creating precedential decisions. 199
Then, in 2014, the Board of Immigration Appeals finally published
a case, Matter of A-R-C-G-, addressing the issue directly. 200 It held that
a gender-based asylum claim arising from certain countries and cultures
could be successful under U.S. asylum law. 201 Specifically, it found
“married Guatemalan women unable to leave the relationship” might
be a cognizable particular social group giving rise to asylum
protection. 202 As a result, many women who had survived genderbased harm were able to find protection. Although the Board of
Immigration Appeals did not publish a case relating to child abuse, its
analysis similarly allowed children who had escaped domestic abuse to
find safety in the United States by seeking asylum. Considering large
percentages of arriving UACs reported fleeing violence in their homes,
195. See, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906, 908-09 (BIA 1999) (en banc).
196. Id. at 906.
197. See A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 318-19 (“Attorney General Reno vacated that
decision for reconsideration in light of a proposed regulation, but no final rule ever
issued, and the case was eventually resolved in 2009 without further consideration by
the Board.”) (citations omitted).
198. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context or Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, at 7,
HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) (“It follows that sex can properly be within the ambit
of the social group category, with women being a clear example of a social subset
defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated
differently than men.”).
199. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010).
200. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 388 (BIA 2014).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 392-95.
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it is reasonable to assume that at least some of these children, relying
on this precedential case law, were granted asylum. 203
Four years later, the Attorney General ended such grants of asylum.
In 2018, using his broad authority to interpret immigration law, the
Attorney General certified a domestic violence-based asylum case to
himself for review. 204 In a wide-ranging decision, Matter of A-B-, he
vacated the 2014 precedential A-R-C-G- decision, which held domestic
violence survivors might be eligible for asylum. 205 He chastised the
Board of Immigration Appeals for failing to conduct a rigorous review
of the law and facts in that decision. 206 He reiterated prior requirements
for defining a particular social group and suggested that “unable to
leave the relationship” was impermissibly circular. 207 He challenged
the idea that men harmed women because of their gender and
relationship status rather than simply because they were criminals. 208
Finally, he sought to heighten the long-standing requirement for
determining whether a non-governmental actor is a qualifying
persecutor for the purposes of asylum claims. 209 In what is arguably
dicta, he concluded, “Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic
violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will
not qualify for asylum.” 210
Not surprisingly, advocates were quick to challenge this decision.
In fact, one federal district court has already enjoined certain
applications of that decision. 211 Nonetheless, the decision’s limiting
effect on asylum eligibility remains. Many UACs who fled sexual
abuse, gender-based violence, or violence in the home—children who
may have quickly been granted asylum between 2014 and 2018—will
now have to fight an uphill battle. They will likely have their cases
denied by asylum officers and immigration judges who must follow the

203. Children on the Run, supra note 4, at 23-29.
204. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 317 (A.G. 2018).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 319.
207. Id. at 335.
208. Id. at 338-39.
209. Id. at 343-44.
210. Id. at 320.
211. Order at 3, Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018);
Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 105.
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precedential decision of the Attorney General, at least until a federal
circuit court holds otherwise.
Not all UAC asylum applicants were able to benefit from A-R-CG-. On the contrary, those UACs who fled other harm—most
prominently gang violence—continued to face difficulty in winning
asylum. 212 Precedential decisions still consistently denied asylum to
applicants (including children) who escaped some of the most notorious
criminal gangs in the world and who presented uncontroverted evidence
that their home countries were basically failed states. 213 Yet, there were
some exceptions. Some applicants prevailed because the gangs had
come after their whole families, meaning their nuclear or extended
families had become a cognizable particular social group eligible for
asylum protection. 214 Others could be granted asylum because they and
other proposed group members shared immutable histories, such as
serving as witnesses against the gangs. 215 Others might have been
targeted because their own religious convictions compelled them to
speak out against the gangs at their own peril or because their identity
as sexual or gender minorities made them targets for the gangs.
For many of these asylum applicants (including children), A-B- also
likely closed the door to asylum. Even if some may eventually prevail
in appeals to the federal circuit courts, many more will be denied in the
interim. In 2019, the Attorney General exercised his precedential
authority again, this time to restrict access to asylum for those groups
defined by family relationships. 216 In Matter of L-E-A-, the Attorney
General rescinded a prior decision in the same matter that found familydefined particular social groups generally sufficient to sustain asylum
eligibility; only the rarest of such families would qualify. 217
212. See, e.g., Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 221-22 (BIA 2014)
(rejecting proposed social group of “former members of the Mara 18 gang in
El Salvador who have renounced their gang membership”).
213. Id.; see also Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 249-51 (BIA 2014).
214. See, e.g., Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40, 45 (BIA 2017) (finding that
a family constitutes a particular social group, though finding in this case that the nexus
element was not met); Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015).
215. See, e.g., Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013)
(en banc).
216. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581, 586 (A.G. 2019), overruling Matter
of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017).
217. Id.
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While A-B- and L-E-A- did not involve an asylum application
brought by a UAC, it cannot be doubted that the Attorney General was
thinking about UACs when he painted with such a broad brush in
curtailing eligibility for asylum. 218
C. Limiting UACs’ Access to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
In 1990, Congress added a provision to the immigration law
allowing young people under twenty-one years old who have been
abandoned, abused, or neglected by their parents to seek special
immigrant status in the United States and, eventually, receive lawful
permanent residence. 219 The corresponding visas were underused for
over two decades until, suddenly, the surge of UACs created a yearslong backlog. 220 The Attorney General began attacking the idea that
immigration judges should postpone potential deportation to allow time
for delayed visas to be adjudicated. 221 Subsequently, without any
official announcement as to the change in policy, the immigration
authorities reversed course and began denying this status to young
people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. 222 While federal
litigation challenging these actions remains pending and at least one
injunction is in place, this special protection for juveniles is no longer
so easily acquired. 223 Once again, if the administration is successful,
many UACs will find themselves without lawful immigration status.

218. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 320 (grouping gang violence asylum
claims with domestic violence asylum claims).
219. Immigration Act of 1990 § 153(a), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(Nov. 29, 1990).
220. Compare BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA
BULLETIN 4 (Apr. 2016) [hereinafter APRIL 2016 VISA BULLETIN] (showing visas for
special immigrants (employment-based category 4) as “current” (available)), with
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN 4 (May 2016)
[hereinafter MAY 2016 VISA BULLETIN] (showing visas for special immigrants
(employment-based category 4) from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
backlogged to January 1, 2010).
221. See, e.g., Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405, 419.
222. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
223. See J.L. v. Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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1. “Special” Protection for Abandoned, Abused,
and Neglected Children

Immigration law allows for various categories of noncitizens who
present specific factors to be classified as “special immigrants” and to
be granted lawful immigration status on account of such
classification. 224 One such category is for special immigrant juveniles,
which Congress defined as unmarried noncitizens under twenty-one
years old; present in the United States; and, who had suffered
abandonment, abuse, or neglect by one or both of their parents and
whose best interests are not served by return to country of origin as
determined by a relevant state court. 225 In other words, where
appropriate, children who would be protected by the child welfare
system may also be shielded from deportation (after the state court
determines both that the children could not be reunified with their
parent(s) and should not be returned to their country of origin). 226
This category of children, in its nearly three decades of existence,
has been redefined and broadened to protect more children. 227 At first,
the law required the child to be eligible for long-term foster care due to
abuse, abandonment, or neglect. 228 However, in 2008, this provision
was modified presumably after Congress realized it was a narrow
definition that left many children without needed protection.229
Accordingly, Congress legislated that it was only necessary that the
child had been made dependent upon the state and placed under the care
of an institution or individual and that reunification with one or both
parents was not viable because of abuse, abandonment, neglect, or a
similar basis under state law. 230 The same legislative revision replaced
the requirement that the Attorney General “expressly consent” to the
224. See generally INA § 101(a)(27), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).
225. See id. § 101(a)(27)(J)(i).
226. See id. § 101(a)(27)(J)(ii).
227. See generally Dalia Castillo-Ramos & Yasmin Ravar, A New Legal
Framework for Children Seeking Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, 20 RICH. PUB.
INT. L. REV. 49, 52-56 (2017).
228. Id. at 53; see also Immigration Act of 1990 § 153(a), Pub. L. No. 101-649,
104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990).
229. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(1), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008).
230. Id. § 235(d)(1)(A).
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grant of special immigrant juvenile status with simply the “consent” of
the Secretary of Homeland Security. 231
From the very creation of this status, Congress recognized that the
federal immigration authorities were not competent to determine a
child’s welfare and best interest. Rather, such evaluations have always
been squarely the province of the state juvenile courts. 232 So, Congress
created a multi-step process. First, the appropriate state court would
need to exercise its jurisdiction over the child and find the child
dependent on the court or make a custody order over the child. 233 Then,
(under the law’s current form) the same court would have to find that
the child’s reunification with one or both of the child’s parents is not
viable due to abandonment, abuse, neglect, or a similar basis under state
law and it is not in the child’s best interest to return to their country of
origin. 234 The child could then take this order—known in the
immigration world as the “predicate order”—and petition to be
classified by the immigration authority as a special immigrant
juvenile. 235 Concurrently or subsequently, the new special immigrant
juvenile could apply for lawful permanent residence in the United
States. 236
The path to lawful permanent residence for a special immigrant
juvenile is neither direct nor easy. The law requires that the child
interact with multiple adjudicators from both the state and federal
governments; it also requires that the actions of one government be
sufficient for the needs of the other government. Ultimately, however,
it is a crucial protection for these vulnerable young people and often the
only pathway they may have to lawful immigration status in the United
States.
231. Id. § 235(d)(1)(B).
232. See Castillo-Ramos & Ravar, supra note 227, at 56.
233. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, POLICY MANUAL, vol. 6, pt. J, ch. 2, D1 (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/toc. The name of the appropriate court varies
by state including juvenile court, dependency court, family court, probate court, and
orphans’ court, to name a few. Id. ch. 3, A1.
234. Id. at ch. 2, D2-D3.
235. Id. at ch. 4, A.
236. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPLICATION TO REGISTER PERMANENT RESIDENCE OR
ADJUST STATUS 23 (July 15, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/i-485.
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2. Reaching the Visa Cap

A child does not have to be a UAC in order to be classified as a
special immigrant juvenile, but based on the underlying reasons for the
surge of UAC arrivals to the United States since 2014, many UACs
nonetheless qualify for this protection. In fact, the massive number of
eligible children arriving to the United States caused the first of the
recent factors narrowing access to this status. 237
Since the creation of modern United States immigration law in the
early twentieth century, numerical limitations on classes of immigrants
have been a hallmark. 238 Some noncitizens, primarily the immediate
relatives of United States citizens and asylum seekers, are granted
lawful status in the United States without numeric limitations.239
Nearly every other category of noncitizen seeking permanent
immigration status in the United States—more distant relatives of
citizens as well as all relatives of lawful permanent residents, workers
and professionals seeking employment-based visas, and refugees—is
limited by numerical caps. 240 In general, these caps work in two ways:
they limit the total number of noncitizens who may enter the United
States with a certain type of visa, and they prevent immigrants from any
one country from receiving too high a percentage of each visa type. 241
Each year, only a limited number of visas may be given out, which
may be further limited based on the immigrant’s country of origin.
Again, an example is helpful. An adult citizen can petition to immigrate
a sibling to the United States, but only so many of these visas (known
as family-based category four) may be given out each year. 242 Once the
237. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. The timing of the significant
retrogression of visa availability intuitively corresponds to the time it would take for
the surge of children that began arriving in 2014 and 2013 to wind through the state
court system and be ready to petition for classification as special immigrant juveniles.
238. Emergency Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5 (May 19, 1921).
239. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)); id. § 209(b) (not listing any limitation
on asylees granted lawful permanent residence).
240. Id. § 201(c)-(d). Although there is no limit to how many refugees can be
granted permanent residence per year, Id. §201(b)(1)(B), the President establishes the
average number of refugees to be resettled in the first instance in the United States
each year. Id. § 207(a)(2).
241. Id. § 202(a)(2).
242. Id. § 203(a)(4).
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cap is reached, the next person to apply is put in line for the next year.
As of February 2019, the next person in line for a sibling visa filed their
petition back on June 22, 2005. 243 But more visas have been requested
for some countries than others, so immigrants from those countries have
to wait even longer. As of February 2019, the next sibling in line from
Mexico filed their petition on February 8, 1998, and the next sibling in
line from the Philippines filed their petition on October 1, 1995. 244 For
many who want to immigrate to the United States, patience is a
requirement.
The immigration authority has the power to classify young
noncitizens as special immigrant juveniles upon presenting valid
predicate orders. There is no limit to how many non-citizen young
people can be classified. But the fact of being classified as such does
not grant the noncitizen lawful immigration status in the United States,
even though this classification is commonly referred to as “special
immigrant juvenile status.” Rather, being so classified makes the
young noncitizen eligible to apply for lawful permanent residence, that
is, an immigrant visa. These visas, too, are subject to numerical caps
and the per-country limitations.
Fortunately for these vulnerable juveniles (and for humanity), this
category has so far been undersubscribed. In other words, there has
always been a visa generally available under this category for noncitizen youth classified as special immigrant juveniles because there
have not been enough applicants to reach the cap. 245 But, while the
total number of visas has not reached the cap, certain countries have
reached their own percentage caps because of a high number of noncitizen applicants from those countries. 246 Since only a certain
percentage of the visas available can be given to immigrants from any
particular country, some special immigrant juveniles had to begin
waiting in line. 247 The cap “hit” for the first time under this category in
243. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN 2
(Feb. 2019) [hereinafter FEBRUARY 2019 VISA BULLETIN].
244. Id.
245. See id. at 3-4 (for “all chargeability areas except those listed,” special
immigrant (employment-based category 4) is “current”).
246. See id. at 4 (listing final action date of September 1, 2017, for special
immigrants from Mexico and March 1, 2016, for special immigrants from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras).
247. See, e.g., MAY 2016 VISA BULLETIN, supra note 220.
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2016. 248 Suddenly, visas could no longer be issued to special immigrant
juveniles hailing from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Mexico. 249 Not long thereafter, special immigrant juveniles from India
also had to begin waiting for visas to become available. 250
This new backlog clearly has its roots in the significant increase in
arrivals of UACs that began in 2014. It is well documented that many
of those UACs were Central Americans fleeing domestic violence and
gang violence, and thus there is good reason to believe they would be
able to demonstrate both that they had suffered abandonment, abuse, or
neglect by one or both parents (domestic violence) and that it was not
in their best interest to return to their countries of origin (because of the
rampant gang violence). Currently, visas for special immigrant
juveniles from India are immediately available, which suggests the
increase in demand was only temporary. 251 The availability of visas for
special immigrant juveniles from Mexico has fluctuated greatly.252
However, the visas for young people from El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras are currently backlogged approximately three years. 253 As a
matter of law, the immigration authority is currently simply
unauthorized to issue visas to these children allowing them to begin
their lawful permanent residence in the United States until their “turn”
in the line. 254

248. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
250. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN 8
(August 2016) [hereinafter AUGUST 2016 VISA BULLETIN].
251. FEBRUARY 2019 VISA BULLETIN, supra note 243, at 4 (final action date is
“current” for special immigrants (employment-based category 4) from India).
252. Compare AUGUST 2016 VISA BULLETIN, supra note 250, at 4 (listing final
action date of January 1, 2010), with FEBRUARY 2019 VISA BULLETIN, supra note 243,
at 4 (listing final action date of September 1, 2017, for special immigrants from
Mexico).
253. FEBRUARY 2019 VISA BULLETIN, supra note 243, at 4 (listing final action
date of March 1, 2016, for special immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras).
254. INA § 245(a), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)) (requiring that a visa be available in order for
an application for adjustment of status to be granted).
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3. Marching Forward with Removal Proceedings
The availability of visas for special immigrant juveniles has
nothing to do with the Trump administration. The cap for young people
was “hit” for the impacted countries during the last administration, and
the immigration authority was obligated to follow the law and delay
issuing visas to these immigrants unless and until the visas became
available. 255 The administration does control, however, whether
immigration judges and immigration enforcement agents are willing to
give special immigrant juveniles the opportunity to wait their turn.
While any non-citizen youth present in the United States who meets
the eligibility requirements may apply for classification as a special
immigrant juvenile, many of the applicants in recent years have been
children who were previously apprehended by immigration officers and
classified as UACs. Virtually all of these children upon apprehension
were issued a Notice to Appear, a charging document that begins formal
administrative removal proceedings before an immigration judge. 256
During these proceedings, the immigration judge is charged with
determining whether the UAC is subject to removal from the United
States (most are by virtue simply of being noncitizens present without
lawful immigration status) and, if so, whether the child is eligible for
some relief from removal. 257 If a UAC seeks asylum, initial jurisdiction
will be vested in an asylum officer; if asylum is not granted by the
officer, the decision is subject to a renewed de novo application with
the immigration judge. 258 But applications for special immigrant
juvenile status are different. The predicate findings are made by a state
court judge, and the special immigrant classification is determined by
the Department of Homeland Security. 259 The immigration judge has
no jurisdiction over either of these steps in the process (although the
255. See id.; see also supra note 220 and accompanying text.
256. See TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(5)(D), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077
(2008); see also KANDEL, supra note 74, at 12 n.64.
257. See INA § 240(a)(1), (c)(1), (c)(4).
258. INA § 208(b)(3)(C) (vesting initial jurisdiction in the asylum office). There
are no implementing regulations for this provision, so it is generally assumed that the
regulations related to referred affirmative asylum applications apply. See 8 C.F.R. §
208.9(b) (2019) (defining generally how an asylum officer must conduct an asylum
interview).
259. See Castillo-Ramos & Ravar, supra note 227, at 51.
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immigration judge, in some circumstances, can adjudicate the visa
application once special immigrant juvenile classification has been
approved). 260 Nonetheless, the immigration judge is expected to
preside over active removal proceedings and determine whether the
special immigrant juvenile applicant is eligible to remain in the United
States. Immigration judges across the country, therefore, find
themselves charged with adjudicating the removal proceedings of
UACs who are clearly subject to removal; who have been adjudicated
as dependents by state court judges who concluded it is not in the
children’s best interests to return to their countries of origin; and, who
have been classified by the Department of Homeland Security as special
immigrant juveniles; and yet, the child is currently without lawful
immigration status and thus currently has no legal claim to remain in
the United States. What is the judge to do?
Administrative closure has been a docketing tool available to
immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals for
decades. 261 This tool is a way to temporarily remove a case from the
immigration judge’s active docket. 262 In these situations, there is no
final conclusion of the case; it remains under the judge’s jurisdiction,
but it is filed away until further action is ready to be taken. 263 For
decades, administrative closure was used when the parties were not
ready for final adjudication, such as when the parties were awaiting the
results of a collateral matter that would fundamentally affect the
outcome of the removal proceedings (e.g., issuance of a longbacklogged visa). 264 Administrative closure was also used when the
immigration prosecutor exercised discretion to not seek removal of a
removable noncitizen at a particular time. 265 This tool is not unique to

260. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b) (requiring that the petition for special immigrant
juvenile classification be filed with the immigration authority). But see 8 C.F.R. §
1245.2(a)(1) (vesting the immigration judge with jurisdiction over certain applications
for adjustment of status).
261. See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 690 (BIA 2012) (citing Matter
of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479, 480 (BIA 1996)).
262. Id. at 692; see Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17, 17-18 (BIA 2017).
263. Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 694; see W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 18.
264. See sources cited supra note 263.
265. W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 17.
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immigration judges but is an established tool in other courts as well.266
While no law or regulation generally authorized immigration judges to
administratively close cases, it is referenced by some regulations and is
the subject of precedential case law. 267 For many special immigrant
juveniles for whom visas were not yet available, administrative closure
was a very important way to delay an order of deportation until the visa
could be issued.
In 2018, the Attorney General, using his authority to interpret the
immigration law and to issue precedential decisions, acted to eliminate
administrative closure. 268 The Attorney General axed administrative
closure when he issued Matter of Castro-Tum, which involved a
UAC. 269 In Castro-Tum, the UAC failed to appear before the
immigration judge and, rather than ordering the child removed in
absentia, the immigration judge administratively closed proceedings,
expressing concerns over the validity of service of notice made upon
the UAC. 270 The Department of Homeland Security appealed, and the
Board of Immigration Appeals held that the immigration judge erred;
he should have ordered removal. 271 The Attorney General was
apparently unsatisfied with this result. He ordered the case to be
certified to him and then concluded that, notwithstanding decades of
use, there was no lawful authority for immigration judges and the Board
of Immigration Appeals to administratively close cases. 272 Thus, a tool
that allowed immigration judges to manage crushing caseloads and to
focus on cases that were ripe for adjudication was lost. 273
The Attorney General, however, was still not satisfied that all cases
would expeditiously march forward. Soon thereafter, he issued another

266. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 247 (3d
Cir. 2013); Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio LLC, 166 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 1999).
267. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.62(b)(1)(i), (2)(iii), 1240.70(f)–(h) (2019); see also
Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 688; W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 17.
268. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271, 272 (A.G. 2018) (overruling prior
precedent and stripping immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals of
the authority to administratively close cases).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 273-74.
271. See id. at 274, 290-91.
272. Id. at 281-94.
273. See id.
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precedential decision, Matter of L-A-B-R-. 274 In that case, the Attorney
General considered the authority of immigration judges to continue
removal proceedings, specifically in the context of collateral matters
outside the immigration judge’s control. 275 While he adopted the longstanding “good cause” standard, he cautioned, “‘Good cause,’ in other
words, does not mean ‘no cause’ or ‘any cause.’” 276 The Attorney
General did not hide his inspiration for this conclusion nor his reasoning
for issuing a rare precedential decision on this matter: “The overuse of
continuances in the immigration courts is a significant and recurring
problem. Unjustified continuances provide an illegitimate form of de
facto relief from removal.” 277 By this holding, the Attorney General
restricted immigration judges in granting continuances to allow the
adjudication of immigration applications such as petitions for special
immigrant juvenile classification with other adjudicators, even though
those adjudications, if successful, would obviate the need for removal
proceedings by granting the noncitizen lawful immigration status.278
Admittedly, the cases under review in L-A-B-R- were extreme examples
of continuances issued by immigration judges over the objections by
the prosecuting attorneys, but the case’s conclusion is clear: noncitizens
cannot assume they will be given time to pursue collateral remedies.279
Neither Castro-Tum nor L-A-B-R- addressed the issue of UACs
seeking classification as special immigrant juveniles or, thereafter,
seeking lawful permanent residence. Indeed, given current processing
of these cases, limiting access would be problematic: federal law
requires adjudication of special immigrant juvenile petitions within six
months, yet the Department of Homeland Security is currently in
flagrant violation of this Congressional mandate. 280 However, it is not
274. See generally Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018).
275. Id. at 405-06.
276. Id. at 407.
277. Id. at 411.
278. Id. at 419 (“I therefore conclude that an immigration judge must assess
whether good cause supports a continuance to accommodate a collateral proceeding
by considering primarily the likelihood that the collateral relief will be granted and
will materially affect the outcome of the removal proceedings, and any other relevant
secondary factors.”).
279. Id. at 409-19.
280. See TVPRA § 235(d)(2), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008)
(“All applications for special immigrant status under section 101(a)(27)(J) of the
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hard to imagine that UACs—perhaps especially older teens who are far
back in the line for visas—will soon find themselves told by
immigration judges that they have not established good cause to delay
their deportation any longer. As absurd as it may sound, a state court
judge’s ruling that a child should not be returned to their country of
origin and Department of Homeland Security’s classification that the
child is a special immigrant juvenile, may not shield from deportation
the youth whose visa remains out of reach.
4. Interpreting the Law to Exclude Older Teens
The definition of “child” is important because many paths to lawful
immigration status are based on family relationships and may allow
family members to accompany the principal immigrant. For most
immigration purposes, “child” is defined broadly to include young
unmarried people under the age of twenty-one. 281 This same age cutoff was promulgated by regulation for special immigrant juveniles. 282
Yet, now efforts are underway to restrict access to this protection for
older youths. 283
At first, the idea of a special immigrant juvenile who is eighteen,
nineteen, or twenty years old may be confusing. In this country,
eighteen is generally the age of majority. Since special immigrant
juvenile classification requires a predicate finding by the state juvenile
court that the child is dependent on the state or placed under the custody
of another, classifying such a youth as a special immigrant juvenile
might seem impossible. This is not the case. Just as Congress
recognized that young people should continue to be considered children
until twenty-one for many purposes, some state legislatures and state

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J)) shall be adjudicated by the
Secretary of Homeland Security not later than 180 days after the date on which the
application is filed.”).
281. INA § 101(b)(1), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)) (defining child as under twenty-one years old
for most immigration purposes). But see id. § 101(c)(1) (defining child differently for
citizenship and naturalization purposes).
282. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1) (2019).
283. See, e.g., J.L. v. Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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courts have done the same. 284 At least several states allow for a youth
over eighteen to have the state court exercise proper jurisdiction and
thereafter make the required predicate findings for special immigrant
juvenile classification. 285
Many of these youths, some of whom were UACs, were able to
benefit from the state court processes available to them and to thereafter
be classified as special immigrant juveniles and acquire lawful
permanent residence. Then the immigration adjudicators began
pushing back. Notwithstanding the clear federal law allowing for
classification of youth of this age, adjudicators began denying these
applications, generally finding the underlying state court predicate
orders were not valid for these purposes. 286 Federal litigation quickly
followed. 287
There was no change in the regulations as to who qualifies for
special immigrant juvenile classification and how cases of older youths
should be adjudicated. 288 There was no official policy statement or
memorandum issued publicly. But, through federal litigation, internal
guidance to adjudicators became public. 289 While the guidance is
carefully couched so as not to require across-the-board denial of these
applications, the subtext is clear: these applications should generally be
denied. 290 A unitary result, however, is not possible because whether
284. See, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 1510.1 (West 2019); Md. Code Ann., Fam.
Law § 1-201(b)(10) (West 2017); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 661(b) (McKinney 2019); see
also Recinos v. Escobar, 473 Mass. 734, 739 (2016).
285. See sources cited supra note 284.
286. See J.L., 341 F. Supp. 3d at 1061; see also R.F.M. v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp.
3d 350, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
287. See generally J.L., 341 F.Supp.3d at 1061; see also R.F.M., 365 F.Supp.3d
at 360; Budhathoki v. Nielsen, 898 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 2018).
288. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(4) (2019). In fact, it is important to note that the
regulations have not been updated to incorporate the changes made to the law a decade
ago by TVPRA 2008 (still referring to long-term foster care requirement).
Budhathoki, 898 F.3d at 508 & n.4.
289. See Certification of Administrative Record at AR0728-37, R.F.M., 365 F.
Supp. 3d 350 (No. 18-cv-05068-JGK) (internal adjudication manual specifying basis
for rejecting post-18 bases for special immigrant juvenile classification).
290. See id. at AR0728 (“When a court loses the capacity to order a child’s
reunification with a parent at age 18, they necessarily cannot make a juridical
determination that reunification is not viable . . . . The burden is on the petitioner to
establish eligibility. Generally, a petition should not be denied based on USCIS’
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classification is valid will depend entirely on the technical substantive
and procedural law of the state that issued the predicate order in
question. 291 A federal court in Texas ruled against youths seeking this
classification. 292 Litigation is ongoing in New York as it is in
California, where the government is currently enjoined from denying
applications for special immigrant juvenile classification for these older
youths. 293 Attorneys and observers can only speculate how these cases
will end.
D. Increased Desirability of Voluntary Departure
As discussed above, under the Trump administration, UACs are
less likely to be released from government custody or are at least likely
to be detained longer; will have fewer opportunities to seek asylum and
will have greater difficulty providing substantive eligibility; and, may
not be given the opportunity to seek special immigrant juvenile
classification and/or await subsequent lawful permanent residence.
This brings an alternative solution to the surface, albeit not the one
arriving immigrants generally desire: voluntary departure.
At the conclusion of removal proceedings, if the immigration judge
finds the noncitizen appearing before the court is subject to removal and
is not eligible for a remedy from removal, the judge must order
deportation. 294 With deportation comes a ten-year bar from reentry to
the United States, even if otherwise eligible. 295 Reentry after an order
of deportation may have even harsher consequences, including criminal
penalties. 296 But there is one important exception to deportation,

interpretation of state law, but rather officers should defer to the juvenile court’s
interpretation of the relevant state laws.”).
291. See id. at AR0732-37 (distinguishing different states’ laws).
292. Compare, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 1510.1 (West 2019) (statutorily allowing
a guardian to be appointed to a noncitizen youth between eighteen and twenty-one
years old in conjunction with a petition for findings regarding eligibility for special
immigrant juvenile status), with Recinos v. Escobar, 473 Mass. 734, 734 (2016).
293. See, e.g., J.L. v. Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2018). See
generally R.F.M. v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp. 3d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
294. See Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 462, 465-66 (A.G. 2018).
295. INA § 212(a)(9)(A), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).
296. Id. § 276(b).
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known as voluntary departure, which may serve as the smallest of
consolations.
A grant of voluntary departure allows the noncitizen to
“voluntarily” depart the United States in lieu of deportation.297
Substantively, the result is the same because the noncitizen must depart,
but legally and practically there are some crucial differences. The
noncitizen who complies with a grant of voluntary departure will not
have the legal bar to subsequent reentry on account of having been
deported, which can be especially important if they hope to someday
immigrate through a family member. 298 The individual will generally
be given a date by which to leave, thus having at least some time to
settle their affairs. 299 Most will be able to leave by ordinary commercial
transport, not in shackles. 300 For someone who wants to avoid the
stigma of being deported, voluntary departure can be a great option.
Certain requirements must be met, however, if individuals wish to
be granted voluntary departure. Unlike deportation, voluntary
departure is achieved at the expense of the noncitizen. 301 The
noncitizen must demonstrate that they have the means and intent to
depart and may be required to post a bond to prove that intention. 302
Voluntary departure is also unavailable to certain noncitizens, including
some recently arrived noncitizens, noncitizens who sought entry at a
port of entry, and noncitizens with serious criminal or terrorist
backgrounds. 303 Finally, if detained, a noncitizen granted voluntary
departure will remain detained until voluntary departure is achieved. 304

297. Id. § 240B(a)(1), (b)(1).
298. Individuals granted voluntary departure who do in fact voluntarily depart
may, however, still be barred from reentry on account of unlawful presence. Id. §
212(a)(9)(B).
299. Id. § 240B(a)(2)(A) (allowing up to one hundred twenty days to depart
under certain conditions), (b)(2) (allowing up to sixty days to depart at the conclusion
of proceedings).
300. Id. § 240B(a)(1), (b)(1) (requiring noncitizen to purchase their own
transportation at their own expense).
301. See id.
302. Id. § 240B(b)(1)(D) (requiring a showing of “clear and convincing
evidence” that the person has the means to depart and intends to do so); (3) (requiring
bond at the conclusion of proceedings to ensure departure).
303. See id. § 240B(a)(1), (a)(4), (b)(1)(B)-(C), (c).
304. 8 C.F.R. § 240.25(b) (2019).
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Presumably recognizing some UACs may repent from their
decision to travel to the United States or might not qualify for lawful
immigration status and that such vulnerable children should not have
the stigma and consequences of an order of deportation, Congress
granted to UACs special access to voluntary departure. 305 The
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 authorized
voluntary departure for UACs at no expense to the children. 306 No other
strings are attached. Given the specificity of this rule, it is reasonable
to presume almost all UACs are eligible for voluntary departure,
notwithstanding their time and manner of entry, their history, or their
means to depart.
Given the issues discussed above, in the current political climate,
many UACs will find voluntary departure to be their best option.
Lacking a sponsor who is willing to speak for them and thus suffering
detention fatigue and being told their prospects for substantive lawful
immigration status have greatly diminished, many children may choose
simply to ask permission to depart the United States. Given the same
or worsening conditions in countries of origin, however, UACs are
unlikely to find the reasons for their initial departure mitigated.
Unfortunately, many may try to repeat the harrowing journey to the
United States and to seek more remote and dangerous entry points in
hopes of avoiding detection.
V. DISINCENTIVIZING COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW AND THUS
INCREASING VULNERABILITY
UACs are not given a free pass to gaining immigration status in the
United States. Each one will have to navigate the labyrinthine system
in hopes of finding a permanent home in the United States. 307 To that
end, Congress has specifically directed the government to ensure that
UACs in government custody are made aware of their rights and
responsibilities throughout the legal process. 308 A network of not-forprofit organizations and law firms endeavor to ensure these children are

305.
(2008).
306.
307.
308.

TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(5)(D)(ii), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077
Id.
See id. § 235(a)(5)(D)(i) (all UACs placed in removal proceedings).
Id. § 235(c)(4)-(5).
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well-informed and, to the extent possible, represented by legal
counsel. 309
Once released from federal custody, it is up to the UACs and their
sponsors to ensure compliance with the law and to find legal counsel to
represent them throughout the process. Competent legal counsel,
committed to honestly explaining to their clients the possibilities for
lawful immigration status in the United States, will find themselves
increasingly disappointing UACs with the news that protection may no
longer be within reach. As the prospect for winning their cases dims,
the incentive for complying is removed. Their attorneys will continue
to tell them to show up to court, to diligently prepare their applications,
and to not work without authorization but that they should also prepare
for the reality of having their cases denied and needing to return home;
internal and external pressures, however, will understandably
encourage the opposite reaction. The American immigration story is a
story of optimism, but as the hope for lawful immigration status
decreases, the likelihood that UACs will rely on the legal process will
also diminish—especially when it comes to older teens who have
already become accustomed to making their own way in the world.
Even for those UACs who remain faithful to the legal process, the
narrowing of protections will make compliance more difficult. As
asylum and special immigrant juvenile status are less generously
granted, these children will have to endure through the appeals process
until, hopefully, they eventually find protection. Status that should be
acquired within six months may take years. 310 In the meantime, many
of these children may finish high school and find they have worn out
their welcome at the sponsors’ homes but do not yet have work
authorization. 311 Especially for older teens who need to support

309. See Shain Aber & Anne Marie Mulcahy, Legal Services for
Unaccompanied Children, VERA INST. OF JUST., https://www.vera.org/projects/legalservices-for-unaccompanied-children (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
310. Cf. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(2) (requiring that application for special
immigrant juvenile classification be adjudicated within 180 days). Practitioners know
this is not occurring.
311. Only certain classes of noncitizens are granted work authorization. See 8
C.F.R. § 274a.12(c) (2019). Some grants of work authorization are intentionally
punitive. See id. § 208.7 (delaying, perhaps indefinitely, access to employment
authorization for any asylum seeker who creates any delay in adjudication of their
application).
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themselves or contribute to the household, the inability to work lawfully
for years is likely to be hugely problematic.
Lacking hope or just the ability to survive, these UACs are likely
to fade into the population of noncitizens without lawful immigration
status, working and living in conditions that make them incredibly
vulnerable to exploitation. It does not take much supposition to assume
these children may soon find themselves in dangerous situations at best
and the most horrid situations of human trafficking—slave labor and
sex work—at worst. 312
With that, perhaps Congress’s design in the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act becomes clear. With this law, Congress
created “permanent protection for certain at-risk children,” including
the expanded access to both asylum and special immigrant juvenile
status discussed above. 313 Congress provided these protections to all
UACs, not just survivors of human trafficking, because all UACs can
find themselves on the path to this horrendous form of human
exploitation. Ignoring such far-sighted protections—or working
against them—subjects children to the harm the law meant to address.
VI. A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY
Since 2014, over two hundred thousand UACs have been
apprehended by immigration officials upon arrival to the United
States. 314 The legal outcome of these children’s cases is unclear. While
the Executive Office for Immigration Review reports on the percentage
of UACs who have been ordered removed for failing to appear at their
immigration court hearings, the substantive outcomes of the cases of

312. See, e.g., Abbie VanSickle, Overwhelmed Federal Officials Released
Immigrant Teens to Traffickers in 2014, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/failures-in-handling-unaccompaniedmigrant-minors-have-led-to-trafficking/2016/01/26/c47de164-c138-11e5-94437074c3645405_story.html; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District
of Ohio, Dep’t of Justice, Another Defendant Pleads Guilty in Connection with Labor
Trafficking of Minors at Ohio Egg Farm (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndoh/pr/another-defendant-pleads-guilty-connectionlabor-trafficking-minors-ohio-egg-farm.
313. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d).
314. See TOTAL MONTHLY UAC APPREHENSIONS, supra note 4; FACTS AND
DATA, supra note 4.
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those children who did appear are not so readily provided. 315
Nonetheless, given the overwhelming number of cases pending before
the immigration courts, it is fair to assume the cases of many of the
UACs who arrived in the last years remain pending. 316
As discussed, the last three years have seen significant efforts by
the federal government to limit the UACs’ ability to access and to
succeed in requesting permanent permission to remain in the United
States—primarily in the forms of asylum and special immigrant
juvenile classification. Further, while immigrant children are legally
entitled to benefit from public education, many of the UACs who have
arrived in the last several years will by now have aged out of public
education. 317 For those whose applications for protection have not (yet)
been denied, many will nonetheless not be eligible to work legally in
the United States even if they have reached the age of majority. 318
At the same time, the rhetoric regarding these children has changed
dramatically. There has undoubtedly been a rash of extreme violence
in certain parts of the country that appears to be tied to gang violence
with certain roots in Central America. 319 Government officials have
been quick to suggest UACs are, across the board, affiliated with such
violent gangs and responsible for the harms that have befallen some

315. See STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 33, at 33 (providing in absentia
removal rates for UACs), 14 (providing substantive outcomes but not specifying rates
for UACs).
316. Id. at 8-9 (reporting that as of the conclusion of fiscal year 2017, there are
over 650,000 cases pending before the immigration courts nationwide).
317. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); FACTS AND DATA, supra note
4 (reporting that for the last several years at least two-third of UACs have been fifteen
years old or older).
318. Those with pending applications for adjustment of status may be granted
work authorization. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9) (2019). But, given the backlog in visas
for special immigrant juveniles from Central America, UACs may have to wait years
before they can file their applications for adjustment of status (and the corresponding
application for employment authorization). See FEBRUARY 2019 VISA BULLETIN,
supra note 243, at 4. Similarly, those with pending applications for asylum can
eventually apply for employment authorization. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(8). But, any
misstep by the applicant that delays the application, even inadvertently, may
indefinitely delay eligibility for employment authorization. Id. § 208.7.
319. See, e.g., Liz Robbins & Nadia T. Rodriguez, The Gang Murders in the
TIMES
(July
12,
2017),
Long
Island
Suburbs,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/nyregion/ms-13-murders-long-island.html.
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living in those communities. 320 Yet, this rhetoric fails to recognize
recently-arrived UACs are often the community members most
vulnerable to the harms being perpetrated. 321 To their horrid surprise,
UACs who fled the violence of their home countries may have found
the violence preceded them and awaits them here in the United
States. 322
It would be naïve and dishonest to suggest that of the hundreds of
thousands of UACs who arrived to the United States in recent years,
none have violent pasts or bad intentions. 323 However, it is equally
insidious to suggest all or most or many of these children do have such
aspects. 324 Such a false narrative, combined with the tactics discussed
above, has been and will continue to be a powerful tool. When fleeing
children are no longer seen as vulnerable but rather as criminals,
malefactors, and—most disturbingly—”animals,” 325 it becomes easier
for society to accept the idea these children should not be protected
from almost certain harm and death upon deportation.
With that, the myth that UACs arrive to the United States to harm
us justifies the decision to do everything possible to expel them.
Notwithstanding conclusions by the international agency designated by
the United Nations to protect those fleeing and the clear instruction by
Congress to protect all UACs, protection will elude their grasp. This,
in turn, will push them further from mainstream society. Told that they
have few prospects to remain permanently in the United States, that
they may not express their human dignity by sustaining themselves, and
having their very status as human beings denigrated, many will likely
slip from one legal limbo—being the subject of long-pending
immigration court proceedings—to another—being another noncitizen
present in the United States with no prospects of ever becoming a full
member of our community. Should that happen, we will indeed have
scores of newly arrived, young immigrants who are permanent
320. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 3.
321. See, e.g., Jonathan Blitzer, How Gang Victims Are Labeled as Gang
NEW
YORKER
(Jan.
23,
2018),
Suspects,
THE
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-gang-victims-are-labelled-asgang-suspects.
322. See id.
323. Id.
324. Cf., e.g., Children on the Run, supra note 4.
325. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 3.
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outsiders to our community—permanently excluded, permanently
marginalized, and permanently vulnerable.
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